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EDITORIALS

Preface or Epilogue ?

Is the title of this number of *The Student World* not an impertinence or at least a sign of extraordinary naiveté ? Should we not rather join the modern chorus and write a polite *epilogue* in which we state with regret that Christian morals are slowly but surely dying out ?

It has become the common conviction of intellectuals of all classes that whatever we may hope to see happen in the realm of morals, it is out of the question that Christian morals may be restored to the central place which they once occupied. Friedrich Nietzsche was the forerunner of the great host of authors and teachers who have prophesied this twilight of Christian morality. And he knew why he said it. As he witnessed Christian faith breaking down, he drew the natural conclusion that the time of breakdown of Christian living could not be far off.

After him came the prophets of a new morality. In the name of such new gods as the autonomous ego, the inherent sacredness of Life, of the Class or of the Nation, they proclaimed codes of behaviour which seemed to be able to replace Christian morals. But none of these new systems has succeeded in establishing a new moral orthodoxy.

It is, therefore, not unnatural that we have now passed into a further stage and that it is fast becoming typical for the present generation to refuse its allegiance to *any* moral system. The disillusioned spokesmen of youth in many parts of the world agree in this conviction : there is no such thing as a binding moral obligation. It is all a matter of relative decisions.

This does not mean that there is good reason to accuse the younger generation of a hopeless lack of moral sense. Frank Matzke is probably right when he says : " Let all moralists put this in their pipe and smoke it : that among us there are no more pickpockets and liars than there were in the good old days ". But if youth is not morally worse, it is undoubtedly more uncertain in matters of morals. It draws the consequence of the teachings of older generations and applies them to life. Why should they hold on to moral systems if these systems have lost their basis of conviction and faith and thus become meaningless ?

Even Christians themselves have contributed to the impression that Christian morals have become out of date. So many of them have complained about the decay of their cherished moral ideals that the outside world has found itself reinforced by them in the belief that Christian standards would soon disappear altogether.

In what sense then can we speak of a " Preface to Christian Morals " ? Only in this sense that the Christian morals which we would preface are not identical with those which have met with such universal condemnation to death. It may be that the particular standards and norms in which Christianity has expressed itself are becoming a matter of the past. Why not ? They have no claim to eternal value. Christianity does not stand or fall with a particular code of behaviour, but with a particular relation to God which expresses itself in many diverse ways. Of those who would hold on to the established morals at all costs we may say what Jesus said of the Pharisees : " They make the word of God void by their tradition ". For Christian morality shares with all other Christian possessions the fate of being a " treasure in earthen vessels ". The vessels may break

and there is no reason to regret them. But the treasure remains. It alone is eternal because it is the Word of God. Puritanism, Victorianism, and a good many other —“ isms ” have their time and pass away. But God remains a living God Who speaks to each time and generation.

For the Christian the real struggle is never one of different systems of morals. It is rather one of different sources of morals. For him the question is not “ What shall we do ? ” but “ Whom shall we obey ? ”.

If this is true there is a justification or rather an obligation to speak of *prefacing* Christian morals. We are called to listen to God's living word to our time. We are called together as a body of Christians, as the Christian Church, to forget about the things that are past and to look forward to the task of interpreting God's Will for the living present.

“ Conscience has its aim and address in God ”, said Calvin when he wrote of the Freedom of the Christian. Our task is not to restore worn-out moral conventions but to produce men who have their address in God.

V. 't H.

Le précédent éditorial accorde à l'âge moderne la décadence et peut-être la banqueroute des règles de la morale chrétienne. Il est vrai qu'il faut accorder à l'esprit de révolte, la légitimité de beaucoup de ses protestations. C'est parce que la morale chrétienne a trop souvent consenti à n'être qu'une morale, au lieu d'être cette expression concrète d'une vie cachée ou secrète de l'âme, et toute nourrie du dialogue avec Dieu ; autrement dit, c'est parce que la morale chrétienne a consenti à ne plus trouver dans la prière son inspiration et son mobile, que beaucoup de nos contemporains l'ignorent ou la refusent. Pour eux, elle est devenue un code aussi abstrait que celui de toutes les éthiques humaines, aussi peu convaincant et aussi gênant. Car, pourquoi obéirait-on à des règles qui cessent de pouvoir nous obliger, quand elles ne sont pas la parole directe, évidente, d'une Présence inté-

rieure, plus précieuse que tout au monde ? C'est ainsi que, les chrétiens ayant réduit les ordres de Dieu à une série de défenses, ceux qui ignorent Dieu déclarent ne pas se soucier de ces interdictions abstraites, qui les empêchent d'épanouir leur vie.

Il faut le dire aussi, c'est parce que suivant le pitoyable destin de tout ce qui ne vit pas, la morale chrétienne est devenue une simple façade, qu'elle s'est dégradée en de nombreux pharisaïsmes. Toute notre vie individuelle et sociale, notre vie d'église, de nations dites chrétiennes, notre vie personnelle, de soi-disants disciples de Jésus-Christ, offre souvent un spectacle de mensonge.

A tous ceux qui refusent la morale chrétienne, parce qu'elle est démentie par la pratique chrétienne, nous n'objecterons rien et nous les remercierons de nous humilier, car nous devons aimer qu'on exige de nous d'être conséquents avec nos principes.

Mais il n'y a pas, dans la révolte de l'âge moderne, que cette indignation devant une trahison de la vérité. Tous ceux qui taxent de pharisaïsme, les enseignements de l'Eglise, n'ont pas seulement d'aussi nobles mobiles. Il leur est souvent facile de prétexter la carence des chrétiens pour refuser ensuite la rigueur des sacrifices ; il y a une façon de repousser ses devoirs d'homme, simplement parce que les droits de Dieu sont difficiles à reconnaître et à subir. Le chrétien ne peut donner aucun assentiment à de pareilles libérations.

En un mot, si la morale chrétienne est critiquée parce qu'elle n'est pas appliquée, nous consentirons à ces critiques, mais nous n'accuserons que nous, et non pas l'inspiration que nous avons trahie. Si elle est refusée, au nom des appétits nobles ou vils de notre égoïsme, nous maintiendrons ses exigences, et plus fermement encore.

Il ne faut donc pas dire qu'il y a une crise de la morale chrétienne, il y a une crise de la *foi* chrétienne. Et c'est de cette crise que souffre notre temps. Aussitôt que, reconnaissant sa dépendance, l'homme ira chercher dans la communion de son Créateur et de son Sauveur, l'inspiration de sa vie, il ne donnera plus la triste image de ses hésitations, de ses scrupules ou de son pharisaïsme, il écoutera ce que Dieu lui

dit, pour lui obéir certes, mais pour trouver aussi dans ce dialogue, la force d'être joyeusement fidèle.

La préface à une morale chrétienne, c'est une certitude chrétienne. Hors de cette dernière, il n'y a que conformisme social, médiocrité, attitude extérieure, et souvent hypocrisie.

P. M.

Morals in Modern Literature

ROGER JEZEQUEL

The subject on which we are entering excites a feeling of irritation in most of those critics who are religiously inspired, an irritation which often takes the form of more or less violent condemnations. We shall not assume this attitude, but shall attempt to remain consistently objective.

Much study is devoted nowadays to the origin and historical development of the various elements of modern sensibility. For instance, the prominence given to instinct, individualism, love of absolute liberty, have been traced back to J. J. Rousseau. "Rousseauism" has been made responsible for explaining the whole evolution of ideas, sentiments and even facts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Outside the scope of literature in the real sense are the works of the so-called scientific moralists. But the treatment of these lies outside the scope of this article. This demonstration, however remarkable it may be as given by Sellière, is too simple. It may be true, and yet not explain everything. Are there many young men today, who act according to a consciously formulated moral doctrine? Doubtless very few. But fewer still would acknowledge themselves disciples of Rousseau, even of Nietzsche or Barrès. Historians study the

sources of the ideas which form the basis of contemporary morality. But psychologists hold that this method leaves part of reality out of account. Since it is authors who are to be brought to justice (the chief culprit being Rousseau and his modern accomplices Nietzsche and Gide), we shall plead in their defence that the hand of moral justice never reaches the worst offenders, namely the political, social, scientific and philosophic events of modern times, and above all the human heart with its passions and its desires.

Another form of imprecision and injustice is the grouping together, willy nilly, of authors who are entirely different, in order better to extract moral doctrines from this amalgam, which is wrongly considered as being common to them all. Or again, another mistake is to forget that these are *artists*, who do not claim to expose moral doctrine, but to express sentiments — often sentiments which are not entirely their own but rather belong to their characters. It is difficult to know in how far they are sincere, and to distinguish between what they secretly approve and what they are content to describe objectively.

A distinction must also be drawn between the original masters, whose thought is always delicate, tentative, full of corrections and finely-balanced positions, and their imitators or disciples, usually more violent, more abstract, with a lack of nuances in their thought. It does not require much to turn a fine sentiment into a common sensation, a clever idea into a paradox, virtue into vice.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, these moral doctrines exist in books ; but before appearing in books they existed in the minds of the readers although often in an unconscious, vague, exaggerated and aggressive form. Of all the various elements of modern sensibility, which we are going to study, there is not one which has been *invented* by an artist, however great a genius, however inspired. Hence (and this will be the conclusion of this article), it is not a question of condemning them but much rather of bringing law and order among them, softening them, turning them to account, in accordance with the eternal principles of the human spirit.

The Love of Life

The love of life forms an undercurrent in the whole of modern literature. It has been justly defined as a form of worship, a new religion. Sometimes it appears as the keynote of modern literature, which marks it with its own particular poetic charm. Sometimes it is affirmed, more or less rationally, as a moral doctrine. It is easy to criticize this (Sellière, Massis, Maritain) by showing up the imprecision, the illusions, the lack of logic, on which it is based. But precision is important only in philosophy. The poets and novelists have nothing to do with it. They know perfectly well what it is, that they call Life.

Life is a joy, an exaltation, the brother of sensation and instinct ; a feeling not only that one exists but that one is alive in every pore, that one belongs wholly and completely to the universe, with all one's senses, emotions and thoughts. The love of life means the desire to drink its cup to the very dregs ; not only to know all about life, but to have personal experience of everything that life can possibly offer. The love of life makes us regard our whole environment with the same excited expectation, the same impassioned observation, the receptivity, the desire to take in something, which an artist feels when placed in front of the particular object of his art.

The love of life undoubtedly enriches man's experience. It broadens his outlook, and makes him capable of more extensive knowledge, greater happiness, deeper unhappiness. The quality of this sentiment depends on the individual character. It has, in short, a broadening influence, but one which works only horizontally, on the same level. It seems to give us nothing but our own character in an intensified form.

Thus some writers seem never to get beyond the mediocre world of pleasure. They describe adolescents, passionate and unhappy, who love life with a fierce affection, but devote this love only to the first sexual impressions of youth (Rodiguet, Cocteau, Jean Prévost). These writers sometimes remain at the primitive stage, even in maturity and old

age ; their life long they remain adolescents. In fact *youth* is to them not a condition but a doctrine.

In other authors the love of life bears the stamp of the sensitiveness of their character, the wealth of their intelligence, or their artistic genius. Whatever exception may be taken to certain parts of the work of André Gide, how can we fail to be moved and conquered by his *Nourritures Terrestres* ? And is it possible not to be affected by the poetry of a Whitman ?

The love of life goes against all the rules laid down by society, moral philosophy and religion. This is why it prefers those aspects of human and natural life which are but little known, rare, *different*, exotic. It is not primarily a thirst for knowledge ; it is rather a desire to taste the strange fruits, the sentimental or intellectual impressions, the sensations, which are unknown to the man in the street. Hence there often arises a certain snobbishness, a rather ridiculous refinement. Here again, everyone gets what he can out of life, and the worth of the man is measured by the value of what he makes his own.

For example, we must point out André Gide's enthusiasm about plants, animals, the natives of Africa, oriental literature, criminals ; he is never more interesting than when seeking and observing ; Thomas Mann's taste for unusual psychological cases ; that of Montherlant for depatriation, for the oppositions and fluctuations of passion, for varieties of sensuality, mixed like the ingredients of a cocktail. The taste of Malraux for violence and revolution ; of Morand for the manifestations of modern creative activity ; of Shaw for anachronisms, etc.

Most French writers dislike the idea of turning their love of life into a religion. As soon as they begin to reason, they return to the prudence and clearness which are natural to them. They would like to divide their minds into two compartments, one for poetry, one for reason. Barrès the poet exalts instinct ; Barrès the social writer opposes it. André Gide suggests a doctrine of morality in his *Nourritures*, but one cannot tell whether he is talking ethics or æsthetics. Read his literary criticisms, his books on travel or psychology,

and you will find a classic spirit, exquisite in its sincerity and balance.

The Anglo-Saxons are not so afraid of philosophizing ; they seem to feel the need of it. Aldous Huxley frankly exposes a theology of life, supported by a theory of knowledge, (The One and the Many in *Do What you Will*) and Wells and Lewis also give elaborate theories.

Ardour

The love of life urges modern writers to a constant enthusiasm. Life does not allow any rest, any relaxation. It is not sufficient to know life ; we must live it. For these writers the intrinsic value of a character is the degree of enthusiasm by which it lives. There is a doctrine implicit in the modern novel, namely, that the most violent hours in our life are the only times when we are really living ; hours of æsthetic exaltation, hours of sensuality, hours of passion. It may be noticed, moreover, that the essayists and novelists never count the hours of suffering among the hours of life. Enthusiasm can only be applied to joy not to happiness. Happiness is a too general, too involved reality. There must be an immediate maximum, a fullness of active joy.

Evasion

The background of ordinary life, the family, social and intellectual milieux in which we are placed, seldom give scope to this desire for enthusiasm. So people try to evade this life. This evasion is a fundamental theme of contemporary literature.

In the eyes of these moralists, individuals are to be divided into two categories : those who have managed to free themselves and those who have not. Their contempt for the latter is unequalled. It is a curious fact, that this doctrine implies that we are all *a priori* prisoners or slaves. The authors seem to have forgotten that magnificent theme of individuals, who find happiness in the continuation and perfection of their spiritual or social race, which was illustrated by Mere-

dith, and held such a large place in Græco-Roman thought. According to the modern theory, the individual must always break away, not only from his race, but from himself; he must be converted, in fact. This is what André Gide has so often described in his favourite theory of "losing one's life to find it".

The force of this doctrine lies in the fact that it translates a deep, universal truth, not unknown to Christianity, although Christianity gave it a different interpretation, which is perhaps the very opposite of that advocated by André Gide. There has doubtless never been a youth of any worth, who has not suffered from limitations, and longed to be entirely different from what the world wanted him to be. So the success of the theories of evasion partly depends on the existence of this fine impulse. But it depends also on sentiments which are not so pure. In spite of M. André Gide, the Parable of the Prodigal Son cannot be interpreted solely as a justification of a legitimate desire for liberation. Truth forces us to recognize in him a mixture of all sorts of desires. It is this strange confusion — this mixture of spiritual aspirations, the desire for pleasure, the thirst for knowledge, the longing for adventure — which fills the souls of men today, as perhaps it has always done. But contemporary literature has magnified this mixture as a value in itself. Forgetting its usual love for shades of difference, it refuses to see the inherent contradictions in these aspirations.

Hatred of Morality

The logical consequence of this is the doctrine of "immoralism". Here again, contemporary literature has been admirably supported by a definite truth — that there is no rational proof for morality. Literature has thoroughly enjoyed showing that reason is not able to impose moral laws; that morality is largely a result of social customs, and that moral conscience possesses only as much power as we lend it; that "everything is permissible" and that we may "do what we like".

But this dialectic side of the question is secondary.

Modern man hates rather than criticizes morality, and wishes to impart this hatred to others. The result he seeks is the annihilation of conscientious scruples. Our writers rarely stop, like Aldous Huxley or Gide, to look for the numerous arguments by which morality can be proved false, hypocritical, futile or even non-existent. But none of them misses an opportunity of ridiculing it, of expressing his contempt for it. The reason is that morality is the most serious obstacle which they encounter in their policy of evasion.

In this connection one of the most interesting theories in contemporary literature is that of "gratuitous" action. We shall act for the pure pleasure of doing so, or simply as a matter of experiment, without worrying about the effect our actions may have on others. The emotive stimulus, large or small, which they give us will be sufficient to justify them (Gide : *Les Caves du Vatican*, Larbaud : *Barnebooth*) ; modern novels supply hundreds of other examples. The hero lights a cigarette with a fifty-pound note, in order to enjoy the queer emotion that this gives him ; or again, he distributes his wealth among the poor, not from charity, but because of the originality of the action.

The Refusal to Judge

Hatred of morality always goes hand in hand with a refusal to judge. Since life must roll on, normally, apart from any moral belief, the result is that man never has the right to judge his neighbour. His first duty is to perceive the psychological reality, to understand it, and to preserve an ardent sympathy for all its manifestations. According to contemporary literature, by a sort of inverted intolerance this broadness of mind has become a quasi-moral obligation.

The Horror of Choice

Another corollary of immorality is the modern author's aversion to any kind of choice. All desires being legitimate the difficulty becomes serious, and rather than give up one of the pleasures offered by the world, one would give up

everything at once. Moreover, choice always seems to be forced upon us by guiding principles or by moral imperatives. We must, therefore, avoid this as much as possible, we must refuse to choose between two contrary opinions, we must tolerate in ourselves the proximity of different vices. The most characteristic exponent of this doctrine is doubtless H. de Montherlant. In admirable language he describes his every inducement to hesitation : Shall he travel here or there ? Could he not adore at the same time both the Virgin and Mithra ? Shall he or shall he not take to himself the girl who is at his disposal ? The difficulty felt by the modern author in determining his choice, because he fears thereby to cut himself off from other enjoyments, often gives an impression of weakness ; especially when the most violent challenges, the most boastful assertions, do not lead to any positive action.

Possibilities

This is another word that one is constantly coming across in modern literature. There has been built up a psychology of the personality, which does not always seem true to life. The personality is imagined to be essentially elastic, pliant, capable of transformation, almost liquid.

Character-development is not so much a growth or a progressive characterization, as a series of different *attitudes*. The more attitudes one can assume, the richer the personality. The artist must be capable of mysticism and rationalism, kindness and cruelty. A pagan today, he will be a Christian tomorrow. In his own way, of course, and always with due regard for *elegance*. Thus H. de Montherlant is always looking for carefully-balanced alternations. He creates an imaginary world, surrounding himself with crowds of possible enjoyments, and then, when he has them all well in hand, he renounces them.

But again, this love of possibilities seems to us like a defensive attitude, for it is more negative than positive. Above all, it is held that one must never deprive oneself of anything whatsoever, never compromise oneself, never *give*

oneself. By a strange contradiction, it is those who are most in love with life who seem most afraid of living. "Comprehension, creation, service, are all mockeries", writes Montherlant, adding "an irresistible thirst consumes me to be disloyal".

We have mentioned this author because he seems like an exaggerated example, a caricature, of the kind of artist that Gide desires to be. Broadness, adaptability, vivacity of personality, are excellent qualities. But when driven to the extreme we perceive the mistakes to which the theory leads: the extolling of sensuality, the exasperation of the intelligence, an irony which is often vulgar and unjust in its criticism of supposedly hostile values.

Youth

To sum up, all these moral affirmations scattered about in modern literature are inspired by a sort of adoration of youth. Authors concentrate upon their first trembling sensibilities, so vivid and so deep that they become the pattern for all noble emotions, the touch-stone of real "life". They wish to prolong the freshness and integrity of these sensibilities, in all later experiences. Love, thought, art ought constantly to reawaken these impressions in us, if we wish to avoid atrophy, and to remain adaptable and alive. So we shall cultivate desire, we shall even invent new desires. We shall detest any kind of restraint: morality, thought, religion. But sometimes these restraints will themselves become a source of emotion; if so, we shall be converted and analyze our own conversion. Or again, we shall come to prefer intellectual emotions to all others. We shall make use of modes of life hitherto unknown: absence from one's native land, speed, mysticism, play, dreams, even sleep.

* * *

The main themes, rapidly surveyed in this article, are rediscovered in an almost identical form from Nietzsche onwards, in Maurice Barrès (*le Culte du Moi*), in half of Mauriac's novels, in Rodiguet (*le Diable au Corps*), in Cocteau

(*Thomas l'Imposteur, Les Enfants Terribles*), in V. Larbaud, in Rivière, in Martin du Gard's *Jacques Thibaut*, in Pellerin, Jean Prévost, McOrlan, L. Fabre, Suevo, de Richaud, etc., etc.; above all in H. de Montherlant and finally in André Gide, the real genius at interpreting these theories.

Though pushed to extremes by some good authors, and by hundreds of mediocre scribblers, in the works of the best writers these themes are often balanced by opposing factors which moderate them and enhance their hidden strength. Thus, however exaggerated these doctrines are, we find them often counterbalanced by the love of reason, the thirst for knowledge, religious or political faith, æsthetic sense, and natural moral refinement.

Our authors certainly do not admit that these points of resistance are imposed on them *from outside*. They do not want to find restraints anywhere but in themselves, in the most accessible, most individual, most flattering characteristics they possess, and as the result of a free search. They get on their high horse as soon as it is pointed out to them, that they might have discovered these high, unchanging forces in the realities which they despise (family, religion). However this may be, it seems to us that in the modern world those who care deeply for spiritual life should be less apt to condemn certain moral tendencies expressed in contemporary literature, and should rather try to discover the deep reality to which they correspond.

If we were asked, what is this reality? — but we must not stop for this question; it would lead us too far from our subject — we should at once reply that it is a fathomless despair. The despair may perhaps be hidden or exalted, transformed or “sublimated”, but an attentive ear cannot fail to hear its voice from every page of the considerable literature of our times.

A Puzzled Generation

VIRGINIA CORWIN

He is a fool who dares to write about anything as difficult to define as the moral attitudes of American students. Only the newly arrived traveller or the United States Census can speak *ex cathedra* about the country. It is obvious from the beginning that any attempt to generalize will be doomed to defeat, — that at best it can be merely the opinion of an individual. For any statement about student opinion in this country can be speedily disproved by carefully collected facts. There are at least three distinct types of institutions: the great co-educational universities, small denominational colleges, usually co-educational, and separate colleges for men and women; in addition to these differences each institution represents a history and point of view that is in part unique. They are situated in different parts of the country, and draw students who come from home backgrounds in which custom and moral standards are widely divergent. Even in a single college or university it is possible to collect student reports of attitudes directly opposed to one another. Both are current in one university, among different groups, but for that reason no single statement can be true of all.

This very divergence of standard is the only undeniable fact in the whole situation. One cannot make statements without qualifying them or explaining to what kind of college and to which part of the country they apply. It may be impossible that a country as large as ours should agree in even so important a concern as a moral standard, but if so we are throwing overboard the unifying and determining power of religion. Fifty, or even thirty years ago, differences were not nearly so wide as they are today. We are in a period of confusion as to moral thought, and the best that one can do is to try to examine the factors that appear to influence our thinking. The main points about which present student thinking is centering are four: relations

between men and women, drinking, smoking, and various issues which can be grouped together as concerns of the social conscience.

One of the tendencies which is most widespread is the conviction that life is inherently worth while. Physical and sensuous as well as intellectual and spiritual enjoyments are good, say the spokesmen for this belief, — and life is a unity. The strength of this conviction marks the swing of the pendulum from the extreme of denial which it reached under the Puritan ethic, and from the puerile evasions of the Victorian era. Student communities are characteristically freer in their expression of the joy of life than older groups.

Although the attitude is the shared possession of most students, the implications of their conviction divide them into three clearly distinguishable groups. The first is made up of those who draw from it the desire to make life franker and more natural. Joy in life is for them closely coupled with reverence for life. They find a new understanding of themselves and other people, and a saner knowledge of the other sex gained from both love and friendship. It is a point of view which sees as potentially good the physical relationships which are at the basis of marriage, — an attitude from which must spring more lasting and successful marriages. Pleasure is certainly for them a good, — but it is not the sole test of experience.

A second group, starting from the same point, have taken their philosophy farther along the same line. If life is good then there cannot be too much of it. Pleading that "there is much beauty for want of which we unnecessarily starve ourselves", they press on to sexual intimacies which may even go to the length of intercourse, for the increasing ease of obtaining contraceptives undoubtedly increases the safety of such a philosophy. Theirs is the strength of logic, or rather of the extreme position which has found it easy to include one act after another among the pleasurable and worth while experiences of life. How large this second group may be it is impossible to say, but it is probably small.

The third group is distinguished rather by its incoherence

and lack of philosophy than by agreement as to attitudes, which may vary from high idealism in men-women relationships to promiscuity. They seize on the general conviction that life is good, without making of that a philosophy. They want to enjoy life ; they are led on by impulse, and curiosity, and a willingness to taste experiences. They are pushed hither and yon, driven by the desire for popularity to accept that which may conflict with standards brought over from home influences. They justify themselves by a pseudo-psychology which is suspicious of the repression of any impulse. They are most marked by a hazy, incoherent lack of moral insight.

The ever-increasing economic equality between the sexes is another factor at work in the situation. It is no longer a militant demand on the part of women for freedom, but rather the acceptance of an economic fact which has arisen from a variety of causes. The young man who enters business cannot immediately support a wife, and during the postponement of marriage which this means, the girl usually takes a job. Even after marriage the job may be continued from choice or to give greater stability to the new home. This independence of women, starting in the economic field, quite naturally influences other aspects of life. It lends colour to the theory that perfect equality between the sexes should make possible equal sharing of any experience, — that in that sense there should be a single standard. It means a lessening of the moral prohibitions of sex experience for women ; — it means drinking. The last is perhaps the point at which it influences the greatest number of girls.

The whole question of drinking is particularly difficult to discuss because of the anomalous position of the prohibition laws in our country. There can be no question that drinking is widespread among a fair proportion of the student population. It is seldom isolated as a moral issue in its own right : to drink, or not to drink, — because the matter has been complicated by the inclusion of the question of the rights of an individual. Things are further complicated by the fact that for some this flouting of the law has become a convention.

The fourth group are moral issues : pacifism, race equality, industrial justice, etc., — they are in a class by themselves. They are outside the realm of hedonism, and their claims are brought forward by religion. In the nature of the case they stress the social conscience, and demand corporate action, so that they stand out against the current of individualism. To a small but able group of students they are clear issues demanding intelligence and consecrated action, but the great majority seem to remain comparatively untroubled by their vital importance.

For many, then, the divine authority for a moral code is gone, ethics is divorced from religion, and our generation searches confusedly for some substitute. Some think to find it in the doctrine that morals are a product of society to which acquiescence must be given — thus substituting human authority for divine. Extracts from the paper of a student will serve as an example of this point of view and the resulting confusion. " . . . Values have been set up by society and we have accepted them. This belief in honesty is ethical and we adhere to it because not to do so ostracizes us socially, and the persons who willingly go against society are few . . . The object of the moral man is to conform to accepted values rather than to uphold any of his own . . . Accordingly a student who cheats in an examination is wrong only in that he is not conforming to the social code of the world he is in ".

Another attempt is in the exactly opposite direction : to appeal to the dignity and self-respect of the individual as the source of moral rectitude. " If one means (by ethics) the ideals he sets up for himself, within himself, independent of society's stereotyped convention, then there is a chance for ambiguity. For he may consider cheating at an examination as too trivial or unimportant a thing even to be taken into account when considering the things he sets up for himself as a criterion of what a good life is ".

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of student thinking today is its individualism. In all areas of student life this is noticeable. There are not nearly so many student organizations existing on campuses today as there were ten years

ago, and those that do exist have in most cases curtailed their activities. In one of the big eastern colleges for men the religious organization has recently been disbanded in favour of small groups, working together on different interests. Organization is out of favour. This has markedly influenced student attitudes towards religion and ethics. Organized religion is all very well for the person who cannot work out his own, but for the intelligent it has nothing to give. It is inferred that such individualism frees a person for the expression of his own well-developed religion or code of morals. But in fact it does not so work, for individualism has taken the further fatal step into subjectivism.

Quotations from student papers show the influence of this point of view. "A man's ideas of right and wrong are entirely an individual question". Or again, "What would be a moral act to one individual might be an immoral one to another, and vice versa... If everyone has different moral standards, how can any one individual condemn another for such a thing as cheating? Clearly, he can't. The question of cheating on an examination, therefore, may be one of ethics or it may not be". Another student throws up her hands with the remark, "All you can say then is that the question must be met by each one according to his beliefs".

It is this subtle poison of subjectivism that is implicit, I believe, in much of the moral confusion of student thinking today. The student, along with the rest of his world, chooses the freedom of individualism. Even that starting point, however, is quite compatible with a working code of morals. If a man, from the experiences of life and his own appreciation of values, can fashion an ethic which can guarantee his good and that of his neighbours it is possible for some stability to emerge. Such a man can even believe that by following his own path he is arriving at Truth. So speaks any doctrine of the Inner Light, such as that of the Friends. But when conviction vanishes that there *is* any right beyond one's own code, when students have no criterion by which to test the codes of different individuals, then complete relativism has become fatal to the moral sense. Not all students are

caught in that morass, but a very considerable number are stuck fast, and more are confused by it. Surely only clear recognition of the danger of that subjectivism and honest dealing with it can clarify our thinking, and lead us back to firmer ground.

A Preface to the Moral and Social Problems of Chinese Youth

T. C. CHAO

The contact of China with the outside world has made the Chinese people lose faith in almost everything upon which the vast Chinese nation had stood for centuries. Science and social and political theories of every hue have overthrown the ancient order of things and have not succeeded in creating new convictions and strong beliefs. We have acquired a new sense of the value of the human being, but we do not know what to do with him in his family relations, in his social, economic and political adjustments. Man has lost his philosophy of life and is yet required to make much more complicated and delicate adjustments to his new and therefore confused environment. Thus people in close contact with modern currents in China must either be Europeanized and Americanized or be left in the midst of puzzles and perplexities. It is not merely the Christian schools and colleges in China that are denationalizing the Chinese; but the contact with the West in general, through students who study in western lands and return with new ideas, and through the impact of numerous theories and "isms", has resulted in making the Chinese foreign to his own culture. As a result we have confusion and bewilderment in the social and intellectual world. This, added to political disturbances, social unrest, economic depression, military campaigns and internecine warfare, makes the reconstruction of the inner life of China a tremendously difficult task.

In the past the Chinese people lived under the care of a paternal government ; there was a great deal of freedom on the part of individuals and a great deal of elasticity in the working of the law. The thing that counted was personal relations. Now, the situation has changed. People seem to have got a great deal of liberty but much less freedom ; a great deal of law but also a great deal of lawlessness. In the past China had the large family but the small community, so that personal friendship and influence of one's relatives counted for much in the lives of the young folk. But now the family is in process of disintegration, the community has become more complex and there is consequently a mixing up of relations and a breakdown of moral and social standards. In the past China had a philosophy which made it a nation that stood ideally for internationalism and religiously for a type of faith which did not need churches and ecclesiastical authorities. China believed in universal brotherhood and in a religion which may be called cosmic humanism. But now the contact with the outside world has weakened her faith in her own doctrine of a family of nations. It is not difficult to find in China today an anti-foreign spirit, nationalism and racial prejudice, which are the results of China's humiliation through her contact with the powerful nations of the East and the West.

Under such circumstances a great many curious tendencies have developed among thoughtful young people. First, there is now a peculiar type of individualism caused by an inability to cooperate and live together with others, and a weariness of the many theories of life and social reconstruction. The strangeness of the matter lies in the fact that the same people, when in groups, accept a subjection of the individual to the mass, while in individual life they are given to ideas and principles entirely their own. Then, side by side with a high idealism, sometimes running wild as among young communists, stands a sort of self-abandoned hedonism, the source of a great deal of irresponsibility, especially in the relations between men and women. For quite a number of young people life has no other purpose than that of pleasure-seeking. They know too, like some American humanists,

that "we have only each other", and that love is only the enjoyment of the moment. The logical conclusion that they draw from scientific naturalism and from social restlessness is and cannot be more than, "Eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we die". But many others still hold on to their idealism and struggle to find a way of life which will at once be intellectually satisfactory and spiritually able to give them a needed dynamic for the reconstruction of their own lives as well as the life of society.

Ten years ago the young folk were most enthusiastic in the belief that they were the deliverers of their nation. But at present there is more or less disillusionment, and the problem of today is how to find the way out of the present spiritual and ethical *impasse*. There is a new longing for the solution of personal problems, problems of mating, of finding money to go through school and jobs after school, of discovering unifying principles in accordance with which personal and social life may become integrated. Consequently, many of the younger folk are consciously or unconsciously in need of a philosophy of life with a strong metaphysical basis which will show them the way to a future which has some meaning in it.

The problems of youth are in the last analysis three in number, namely, the sex problem, the economic problem and the problem of creating a social and ethical philosophy, a philosophy which will give meaning to and conserve the values of human life. These problems are aggravated by the disturbances within the country and the abundance of stimuli from the outside. The very wealth of theories and plans of reconstruction make these problems more acute and difficult to solve.

Christian youth shares naturally in these difficulties. The romance of a saving of the nation by the students has disappeared in the face of a general disillusionment. The students have in consequence awakened to the fact that the task of reconstructing a nation is not as simple as they have thought it to be. Social institutions have long and deep roots and cannot be uprooted over night. Furthermore, the young mind also begins to realize that it is not sufficiently

disciplined to work continuously on constructive tasks. It is often easily led away by political demagogues, party managers and selfish hobgoblins that live on the suffering of others. The call to service and sacrifice for an ideal society to be realized in the near future, has spent much of its force. This gradual awakening of self-criticism among the younger generation has been turning the minds of some of the thoughtful young Christians towards their own religious faith. There is at present a significant quiet over both Christian and non-Christian students in their returning devotion to their studies in the laboratory, in the library and in the classroom, coupled with a kind of indifference to patched-up theories of social reconstruction. In certain small groups consciousness of the need of discipline has even become acute. Some of them, for instance in North China, realize the breach between the thoughtful Christian youth and the Church and the need for a spiritual home where they may find a meaning for their lives, and desire therefore to come to a satisfactory relation with the Christian Church. They need an adequate Christian literature which deals not only with the nature of the Bible and its teaching, but also with the relation of the teachings of Jesus to the various phases of modern life.

As stated above, their problems are three in number. The sex problem and the economic problem concern them most intimately. There are untold cases of unhappy betrothals, unhappy marriages and illegitimate cohabitation. It would be a mistake for us to think that young people desire to give themselves up to disorder and irresponsibilities in their sex relations. Much of the confusion is undoubtedly caused by pure lust and selfishness, but a great deal of it is also caused by the breaking down of old standards and the invasion of new ideas of life. Unwillingness to sacrifice individual happiness does not seem to go with unwillingness to sacrifice the happiness of others. The newspapers are filled with the complaints of unhappy youth, disappointed in matrimonial or love affairs. Some of them turn toward Christianity for advice and guidance. They agree that the principles taught by Jesus are satisfactory and in harmony with modern ethics, but they are confused as to whether

unhappy betrothals and mistaken marriages are joined together by God and therefore not to be severed by man. Their question is : what would Jesus do if He lived today in helping young people out of their difficulties ? The application of general principles is very different from dealing with special cases, each of which is different from the others. They are no longer willing to listen to dogmatic voices concerning such matters. There is a need of weaving Christian teaching into scientific understanding and human sympathy. At present the Christian Church has not shown itself able to cope with this situation.

Continued warfare and economic depression have made the country much poorer than it was before the political revolution. Many young people whose homes had been tolerably well-to-do have become poor, and yet at the same time they desire to get an education which though cheap costs money. During their school days they have to think and worry about the securing of jobs immediately after school or college graduation. Economic pressure makes for a great deal of restlessness. Without economic independence one cannot build a happy home, and thus the sex problem is related to the economic issue. The question is asked whether western capitalism and western ways of industrialization which has begun in the commercial towns of China, will not mean an even worse oppression of the poverty-stricken people of China. They see the injustices committed by the capitalistic system. Some of them have joined the ranks of the communists and have suffered persecution and martyrdom. They may not agree with philosophy of materialism or their method of violence, but they are very sympathetic toward the idea that capitalism is essentially unjust and inhuman and that all men should secure what is necessary to maintain a proper standard of living. This sympathy with the socialistic views which is so general among the more thoughtful element of the young generation is a very significant fact. It is only natural that young Christians are beginning to wonder where the Christian Church stands in regard to capitalism and to the various types of socialism. The Church has been silent on these problems but from this

time on some definite expression of opinion will be needed in order to keep youth within its fold.

In addition to the need for a solution of the problems of sex and of economic depression, youth is in need of a philosophy of life which will conserve the ethical and social values and give meaning to life and offer a principle of personal and social integration. While there is a great deal of radical thought among Chinese thinkers, the Chinese people, including youth, will naturally seek a golden mean between a philosophy which asserts dogmatically a spiritual interpretation of the universe and a philosophy which as dogmatically asserts that nature is a closed mechanical system indifferent to human welfare. What they desire is a view of life based upon scientific knowledge and related to the best in China's culture, that is to China's "spiritual heritage". There is now among young people a worship of science but this does not mean that they are capable of grasping the meaning of pure scientific abstractions. For them life is concrete and practical, and their philosophy of life must therefore not only be in agreement with the recent results of science but also be able to comprehend the facts of human experience and the meanings that the human mind has given to them. Especially among Christians there is a desire to know what the older people believe and the reasons behind their beliefs. They desire to have a philosophy which is also a theology and which is founded on empirical studies and related to every department of life. As they are free from the impediments of Christian traditions, systems of doctrine and conceptions of ecclesiastical authority and organization, they are free to work out a system of thought which will be elastic and yet satisfactory. At present the main difficulty is that no powerful theologians have as yet appeared among the Chinese Christian leaders.

Christian youth is now consciously or unconsciously turning to the Church for a reasonable interpretation of the Christian faith. The implications of this quest are that the Gospel of Jesus is for the whole man and also for the whole society, that each belief or even dogma must not only be related to transcendent reality but also be connected with a

mundane world, that a theology necessarily carries with it a personal and social ethic, and that all these must be working hypotheses to be verified in the process of personal and social integration. They are asking that if there is a God they should be able to put their finger on him and to say "He is here" or "He is there". Being unable to get an adequate answer to important theological questions, and being unable to give adequate answers to these questions themselves, Christian youth has in many cases to live without a theology and solely with ethical convictions. They need religion in order to relate themselves to the larger processes of evolution, to have an inward assurance of the values of life, to have a dynamic for the carrying out of the purpose of life, and to secure a sanction for personal friendships, social relations and moral obligations which are to them of paramount importance. They need religion, but they also need a philosophy of life. At present they cannot get this from the Christian body, and they have consequently to live without it and to depend only upon their ethical consciousness for the working out of life's problems. These ethical convictions will some day become merely ethical without any connection with religion if they are not soon connected up with the Christian faith by Christian thinkers.

The Christian leaders are not unconscious of the urgency and seriousness of the situation. In the biennial meeting of the National Christian Council of China held in April this year, three college students were invited as visitors to attend its sessions and to present their ideas before the gathering in perfect frankness. For the first time the National Christian Council meeting had a discussion group on the problems of youth. As a result six resolutions were passed, which were almost bodily adopted from the report of the youth group. These resolutions emphasized the seriousness of the situation and the need of the Church to understand it; the necessity of having experts and specialists to study these problems and to give answers to them; the need of conferences between Christian Church leaders and students so that they may face common problems of thought and activity together; the call for an adequate provision of Christian literature for

young people ; the proposals to the larger Churches in important educational centres to form student departments within the Church so that young people could have their own worship and fellowship and at the same time be in the midst of the life and activities of the Church ; and the importance of attention on the part of the staff of the National Christian Council to these matters during the next two years.

Religion must figure in the life of the young. In spite of iconoclastic activities and anti-religious movements, the fact stands out clearly that there is today no lack of religion. The question is, will China have a religion which is purely humanistic, something like the philosophy proposed in Walter Lippmann's *A Preface to Morals*, or will it have a faith which will really relate the Chinese mind and heart to the spiritual core of the universe. China, and especially China's youth, is today in need of spiritual and moral discipline. If a purely intellectual and disinterested way of life can give such discipline, then religion in the sense of a belief in God as the power for righteousness, as a reality whereby human beings become realities, and as the end towards which mankind must go, will not be needed. It may be that the Chinese people can turn to Confucius or Laotze for guidance. These sages lived only a few centuries before Christ. But even these had their religions. Confucius was conscious of his own heaven-sent mission ; Laotze was all the time aware of the natural workings of Tao which makes all things concrete but which is abstract in itself. These sages attained to character and natural religion when they were well advanced in years, but religion is not a matter that merely concerns older people ; it is an even more important factor in young life.

But a return to Confucius is unsatisfactory. Instead, there should be a going forward from Confucius and Laotze toward Jesus Christ, and then from Him toward the religion in which the love of God may be made manifest in humanity as a whole. All the sages had the conviction that what they believed could be verified in the lives of sages after them. Greater works shall ye do if ye believe. It would seem that an adequate preface to the moral and social problems of

youth, not merely of Chinese youth but perhaps of youth in other lands as well, must lead us to look out for an adequate, creative and comprehensive religious life and religious philosophy.

Christianity and Modern Morality

N. STUFKENS

I.

The problem of modern man is the problem of morals rather than the problem of ethics. General principles and standards — such as ethics is interested in — are the concern of the philosophers only. But all of us are vitally interested in the question as to what it means concretely to live the right life. This is the *moral* question. For morals are the forms of life which a generation accepts as the best available answer to the question of good and evil. They are the result of a social cultural process, a compromise between the concrete data of a particular situation with the prevalent convictions about right and wrong. They provide a framework for the actions of the individual, which supports and guides him. Their value is in the fact that they are universally accepted by a community and thus save it from chaos and disorder. If, therefore, we would understand the moral situation of our time, we must analyze the historical development of the morals with which our civilization has grown up.

Western civilization owes its morals to Christianity. When Christianity came into the world it evolved its own moral system, which took the place of such older systems as the Græco-Roman one. In the mediæval synthesis of all life under the auspices of the all-embracing Church, these Christian morals became the authoritative forms of life for all of Europe. And even a good long while after the attacks of the Renaissance and of Humanism had changed the theological and philosophical atmosphere, the moral norms remained the same. Traditional Christian morality remained the unifying bond in European life.

But the work of the artists, scientists and thinkers went on. There came some who attacked the underlying principle of Christian morality, which is that man is bound to a law, not of his own making. The idea of the absolute autonomy of man was enthroned. Man is to work out his own salvation, with the sole help of the potential qualities inherent in his nature.

But even these prophets of freedom were at first conservative in their proposals about the actual contents of moral life. They held on to the old Christian forms. Just as in mediæval times classical culture lingered on although the presuppositions on which it was built had all disappeared, so now Christian morals lingered on, even among those who had lost the faith of which they were the outward expression.

But this could not go on. The incongruity of old forms with new convictions must sooner or later become clear, for the plant cannot live without its roots. As fundamental convictions change, action must follow suit.

It is therefore not surprising that we witness today a general moral uncertainty. It is rather the natural result of the realization that morally our civilization has been living under false pretences, and that after the liberation from Christian doctrine must come the liberation from Christian morals. A civilization which has become secularized in the realm of thought must pass on to the stage of secularism in action.

This is the typical characteristic of our time ; the secularization of *moral* life, which comes as the climax of a long development in western history.

One of the first to see this issue very clearly was Friedrich Nietzsche. He violently attacked the subsidiary arguments for the old morality, which he considered half-hearted attempts to keep things as they were. According to him the only possible consequence of the new view of life — in which man had become his own law-giver and judge — was the one of a purely individual morality of personal sincerity, according to which everyone should express the full potentialities of his own being without regard for any outside law or commandment.

This violent and penetrating criticism of the inherent

falsehood of the situation of modern life was widely echoed. In many spheres of life a new consciousness was created which demanded standards of life in accordance with the new humanistic doctrines. Labour revolted against the paternalism, which had once been meaningful when employer and employed were both conscious of their common relationship to a higher order, but which had now become a convenient cover for exploitation. Similarly the younger generation revolted against the old, because the family idea had been rooted up and lost its meaning. The process was hastened by the great war. It is being asked today, why should we subordinate our lives to any law, to any higher standard, if there is nothing but man in the universe, if man is absolutely his own master, his own judge ?

II.

It is obvious that this moral uncertainty of our time constitutes a danger for our civilization. It is, however, no less obvious that, if our previous analysis is right, this moral secularism is a blessing in disguise for the Church. For it is of the greatest importance to the Christian cause that it should be based on reality, and not on mere survivals which have lost their meaning. In two ways the new situation is a spiritual gain for the Church. It brings a vivid realization of the relativity of all moral expression. Traditional morals — as all moral systems — were the expression of Christianity in relation to particular historical situations, and may therefore not be looked upon as eternally valid or absolutely true. Moreover, the present situation throws the Church back on its supreme task, which is to build a foundation for Christian morals relevant to our generation. As the Church recognizes that it is no asset, but rather a liability, that many Christians defend the old morals for their own sake, it begins to see that it should not concern itself with the revival of the old forms but rather with the creation of the new. Too long already has the Church been content to accept the *status quo*, that is, to let the world decide what morals it would have, and then provide the label : “ Christian ”.

The time has come for the Church to reveal morals which are the authentic expression of its own "ethos" in terms of modern circumstances. It is because of the breakdown of moral certainties — both inside and outside the Church — that we are able to ask in a new way : "What does it mean *today* to be obedient to God ? "

Many answers have been given to this question, which do not meet the need of the hour. Thus the answer that conscience can act as infallible guide for the moral life is practically futile today. Now that all the antiquated has been thrown aside, it becomes clear to modern realistic humanity that the following of the individual conscience leads to the exploding of all common morals. It is in the name of conscience that all great mistakes of humanity have been made, and that all sins against justice and freedom have been committed. In fact the individual conscience is a principle of moral anarchy. For the conscience does not answer the question : " *What* should I do to live the right life ? " It does not help to find the *contents* of morality. In a recently published article by a German student this cry of modern man to get rid of the obsession of the individual conscience finds the following moving expression :

" The moral chaos of our times has made us acutely aware of the question of right and wrong. The answer seems easy. It is said that in all of us there is a voice that tells us what is right and what is wrong. But can I trust my conscience ? It is only to those who have not yet experienced the eternal conflict of conscientious claims that this question looks absurd. All conflicts involve groups and persons, each of which is absolutely certain of his own moral justification. Thus the moral conscience is a camouflage of egotism and much more dangerous because it cannot be fought as such. Is not also the crisis of marriage in our days due to the same reason ? Man and wife cannot really live in fellowship when each follows his own (so-called) moral notions. Conscience may be a necessary stimulus to sincerity, to the service of the good, but if it is used as a source of knowledge about right and wrong, it leads us astray and explodes all fellowship and communion between men " .

There is, moreover, the answer which points to the Bible as the one place where man may find the eternally valid solutions to all moral problems. But modern man finds it unbelievable that this one document among the innumerable productions of humanity should have to be considered as extraordinary or supernatural. Or again the Church points to primitive Christianity as the source of absolute moral authority. But modern man will not let himself be convinced that this period must necessarily be singled out as incomparable with all other epochs. Is then the Church's reference to the life of Christ perhaps a more conclusive answer? Is it not sufficient to picture Him as the supreme example and guide in all matters of conduct? It is not, because we are bound to discover that His relationships, His surroundings were so utterly different from ours, that we cannot use His actions as examples for our own moral conflicts. Christ lived outside vocational and family obligations. He did not live in a democratic age and in a capitalist society. How then can we imitate Him in the actual situations of our everyday life? We can only guess and speculate on this point. It will never give us the firm basis which we seek.

Still another answer which Christians give is the one of modern reason. But this answer to the modern world is merely the same which the modern world has already given to itself. If the Church adopts the spirit of the age, it makes itself superfluous. When the emptiness of this purely rational answer to the moral question was shown by Nietzsche and others, the Church appeared in its extreme poverty. It became evident that it had no answer of its own.

Thus the moral crisis of the world is essentially a judgment upon the Church. But this judgment upon the Church, this crisis of its moral message, is a blessing in disguise. It may lead to a realization of the fact that the Church has lost its own special message in the realm of morality, because it has nothing effective to say in the realm of God's word to man. It may lead us to repent of the fact that the Church is more interested in modernity than in the word of God. The present crisis of the Church is a blessing, if it is the judgment of the living, the eternal Church upon the erring, visible Church.

III.

The real Church, the Church of the Risen Lord, does not adapt itself to its environment. It has the courage to be lonely and to contradict the spirit of the times. Thus the primitive Church knew of the scandal to the Greeks and the stumbling-block to the Jews. It dared to speak of truths which were not man-made. It asserted a revelation, which gave meaning to life because it transcended life. It did not propose to add a new god to the pantheon, but announced that the Word of God had come into the world. This early Church believed itself to be the body of God in the world. But when it grew, the question arose: "How can we express our message in the realm of morals?" Before long the exigencies of the larger world with which it came into contact led to compromise. The Church became powerful, but its splendour was bought at a high price. It based its authority no longer on its testimony to the word of God, but rather on the fostering of a piety by which men could be certain of finding salvation.

In the Reformation, however, the view of the Church as the witness of God broke through once more. God alone has authority. No human institutions, no books and no sermons can claim to have the authority which God has. The Church can therefore never be more than a servant. Its only task is to speak in every situation the word which it has received from God Himself. But even so the Church is more than a purely human society. When it serves God, in its own relative and sinful way, and when it does not usurp the place of God Himself, God blesses it and keeps His promise that He will use it.

The formula of the Christian life is therefore "to be called by God in the Church". Faith is a life of obedience; it is to be held by God and to hold on to Him. But obedience is always a matter of concrete situations, not a matter of abstract reasoning and general principles. Faith expresses itself in decisions, in choices *sub specie Dei*, made before God, and not in the application of rational systems. Christian obedience is realistic. It does not dream of a moral per-

fection for it knows of the indispensability of God's Grace at all stages of life. Neither is it quietistic, because it challenges constantly to decision.

It is to this life of obedience that the Church calls with authority. Therein lies the Christian answer to the moral problem. For the Church is the community of those who listen together to the word of God. In Christianity the moral question is always a religious question. It has no wealth of ethical ideas. It has only the attitude of obedience, which in the concrete situation leads to choice and decision. It is, therefore, a grave mistake if Christians absolutize some particular set of morals, or if they try to restore moral traditions for their own sakes. For no morals are truly Christian unless they have grown out of the attitude of obedience to God in a particular situation, and no morals are Christian by themselves and apart from their source and basis of Christian value. It is, therefore, the only fundamental contribution which Christianity can bring to a generation seeking for the good life, to reveal the foundation of obedience which is the beginning and the end of Christian living.

IV.

But the message of obedience by itself is not enough. Men want guidance as to the contents of the Christian life. *What shall I do?* If obedience is to become vital, it must be related to the actual situations of life. This then is the task of the Church: to give substance to obedience, to proclaim the word of God in terms of the realities of the present day. In the universal breakdown of standards, only such a message can help.

But can this be done by the visible Church? Is it not true that in actual life we meet only very seldom with anything like a prophetic attitude in matters of morals on the part of the Church? It is a fact that we see the Church solving moral problems, many years after they have been solved practically in everyday life outside the Church. But while this is all too true, it remains an essential of the Christian faith that the visible and the invisible Church cannot be

separated, that even this poor, ineffective Church which we see is one with the eternal Church, in which we believe. Even if we are forced, as we so often are today, to work outside the Church or even to criticize vehemently its traditionalism and conservatism, we must do so as members of the Church and not as outsiders. The point is that all of our work, whether in the study of the theologian, in the student Christian movements or in the slums, should be done in the consciousness of community with the body of those who listen together to the word of God.

If the Church is to become once more the creative source of a truly Christian ethos, it must open its heart and mind to the world outside. It may not continue to be an isolated island in the ocean of human searching. It must understand the particular need of modern man in a new way. The underlying issues remain the same, but the form in which they appear changes greatly. In an age of mechanization, the character assumed by the question of life's meaning is very different from that in an age of simple, rural life.

In thus fulfilling its God-given task of guidance in moral life, the Church must make use of all that has been entrusted to it as its heritage. Without absolutizing any of the moral precepts which, in the Bible as well as in Christian tradition, have come down to our times, it must constantly test its moral expression in the light of these older answers to the moral question. Without forgetting that all moral standards in the Bible and tradition are concrete solutions of concrete situations, it may learn from these older answers. The Decalogue, the words of Christ, the moral traditions of other epochs, are sign-posts, no more and no less. If we would look upon them as general "principles", as "absolute norms", we would become as the scribes who put the application of principles in the place of obedience to a living God. All that the Bible has to say about moral life is meant concretely. To follow the Bible is, therefore, not to take its moral precepts as literal absolutes for our life, but rather to seek the concrete will of God for the here and now.

Only in this way will the Church be able to regain a truly spiritual authority, for only thus can it become both related

to the reality of God and to the reality of man. This is what the Church has actually done whenever it was true to itself. In the slavery question the call of God to face a very specific moral issue, and not the application of a principle, moved the hearts of Christians. Thus today the call has come to the Church to fight against war.

Similarly in the question of marriage. It is not our Christian task to approach it as an ideological problem, but rather to ask what our common obedience to God implies in this realm. If we do this we find that the fundamental difficulty about marriage today is that it is being approached from the side of self-expression. But standing before God self-expression is not the final word. Before God life is not freedom but service.

Thus the moral question finds its answer only on the vertical and not on the horizontal plane. The Church has to proclaim the message of God, which is the Gospel, in relation to our lives. Ours is the task to realize our calling in the Church and to decide in personal obedience what God wills us to do.

Christian Morality and Self-Expression

A. A. BOWMAN

Wherein shall man find his good ? The answer of the modern world, typified by such writers as Aldous Huxley in England and André Gide in France, may be summarized in a simple phrase : " In free and honest self-expression ". To deal faithfully with ourselves, to recognize the facts, and to release the energies of human nature in a world which sincerity has cleansed of cant and courage has freed from the false and cruel inhibitions of a conventional morality — that is the highest good for man.

Now it cannot be denied that there is much that is alluring in this gospel of the young. Sincerity and freedom, courage

and self-expression are words to conjure with ; and it is not surprising that the policy which they embody should have attained so powerful an ascendancy over the minds of the present generation. That it has done so is surely an indication of vital truth in the policy of self-expression. That policy, which in one form or other is a perennially recurrent phase of culture, is the product of a healthy reaction to an order of society where truth has become overlaid by convention and human life is cramped and atrophied by the power of organized and privileged hypocrisy. In challenging that order modern youth, like the youth of all ages, the youth who followed Socrates, and the German *Stürmer und Dränger*, is fully justified and needs no apology. That at least may be taken for granted. Beyond this point questions begin to multiply.

In the first place it cannot be assumed that the idea of *self-expression* is *self-explanatory* ; and until the idea is explained, we are in no position to assess its value as a gospel of life. Clearly there is a problem here.

The significance of self-expression depends on what we mean by *self*. I take it that in this connection the term connotes the personal mode of being — the common element of meaning in such expressions as “ myself ”, “ yourself ”, “ himself ” and “ herself ”. Whether selfhood is attributable to inanimate objects is a question that need not detain us here. That such objects have an identity of their own may perhaps be granted ; but that identity, so far as our knowledge (and more particularly our scientific knowledge) of them is concerned, is largely, if not altogether, determined by the external relations in which they stand. The selfhood, the identity of objects, therefore, is not like the identity, the selfhood of persons. We do not attribute to the former that inwardness of nature which is characteristic of the latter, and which gives point to the notion of self-expression.

Our problem centres upon the meaning of personal self-identity, personal existence. The question we must ask is the question : What does it mean to be a person ? What does it mean *to be*, when being takes the personal form ?

A person is a subject of experience. By this I do not

mean a mysterious substratum, the unknown sustainer of conscious states — a noumenal Ego or transcendental unity of apperception such as Kant assumed. The conscious states are not separable from the self that sustains them : rather they are its contents, the very stuff of which the self consists. On the other hand the self is not reducible, as in Hume's philosophy, to a mere aggregate or sequence of its conscious states or experiences. There is something more in *it* than in *them*, whether taken singly or all together. This something more is the inner unity which binds them into one — the principle of organization which goes beneath the multiplicity of *my* experiences, and makes me think of them as *mine*. To the idea of experience, then, we must add the idea of internal organization, unity, *system*. When a variety of experiences, which are subjective events, mental states or processes, unite in such a way as to constitute a single comprehensive, subjective system, what we have is personality' the selfhood or self-identity of a subject.

It remains to add a word upon experience. The characteristic mark of experience is consciousness. This must not be taken to mean that *all* experiences are *conscious* experiences. The system of the self includes unconscious as well as conscious states. It does so, however, in a peculiar sense and under peculiar conditions. The unconscious states of a personal self are not like the unconscious states of an inanimate object. They differ from the latter in that they are the states of a conscious subject. That is to say, they belong to the same system of experience to which the conscious states belong. In certain circumstances they become conscious states, and in any case they have an influence upon the latter. To put the matter briefly, the conscious and the unconscious are functionally related to one another within the system of experience to which they both belong.

I must now try to indicate the exact status of personality (*being* in the personal form) to other modes of being. It is of the utmost importance to realize that nothing in the outer world of nature exists as persons exist. The contents of that world are phenomena which reveal themselves as objects of observation and are conditioned by the relations

in which they stand to one another in space and time. The contents of personality are subjective states or experiences. Now experiences do not normally reveal themselves as objects of observation. It is true that by an artificial operation called introspection we can turn them into objects ; but it is not so that we actually experience them : it is not so that they *exist* ; and when I speak of *turning them into* objects, I do not mean that we do anything *to them*, that we change *them* in any way, but rather that we do something to ourselves, that we produce *other* conscious states in our own minds, in relation to which the former take on the appearance of objects. Our conscious states, in so far as they exist at all, exist *as they are experienced* — that is to say, as subjective processes, states of the subject-self.

From this radical difference in their respective modes of being it follows that nothing ever passes from the objective world of nature into the subjective system of personality. No natural phenomenon ever becomes a subjective process. The converse is also true. No subjective process ever becomes a natural event — a being which, in relation to the subjective system to which it belongs, must be regarded as primarily and fundamentally an object of observation rather than a subjective state. When we pass from the objective to the subjective mode of existence, from things to persons, the world begins all over again as a *supernatural* order of being.

To render this account of selfhood sufficiently complete for the purposes of our problem, it should be added that the system of personality is an active system, and that the component experiences, the experiences which constitute its content, are its activities.

Such being the main characteristics of the self, we may now proceed to consider what is meant by “ self-expression ”. The hyphenated term conceals an ambiguity, and may be taken to mean one or other of two things according to the relation assumed between its constituent elements. “ Expression ” is an abstract substantival equivalent of the verb “ to express ” ; but this verb may be used in the active or the passive voice, and the variation will be reflected in the corresponding substantive. Thus when we speak of “ self-

expression ", we may think either of the self *as expressing* or of the self *as expressed*. In other words, the " self " in question may be either the subject or the object of the activity denoted by the word " expression " ; and the " expression " may be either something that the self does or something that is done to it. As a matter of fact these alternatives are not exhaustive. There is a third possibility corresponding to the middle voice in Greek. The expression may be reflexive : the self may be both subject and object, and may stand in the double relation of agent and patient to the implied activity. This in effect is what I take the phrase to signify. Self-expression is something which begins in an activity, and terminates in a state, of the conscious subject. It is an experience of doing, which is at the same time an experience of something done — a going out of the self in the form of action and a return to the self in the form of enjoyment, gratification, or satisfaction.

The question now arises : What are the experiences that fulfil the condition that has just been stated ? What are the activities that are best fitted to give expression to the nature of the self as a spiritual or subjective system ? Clearly they are those which are most directly attributable to the system as such, those in which the self goes into action and returns to itself as an undivided whole of personality. That all our activities are not of this nature is a fact which will readily be granted. Within the total system of the self there are subordinate systems of energy ; and in so far as these release themselves freely and unchecked, they are apt to do so at the expense of the total system. Their autonomy or quasi-autonomy is injurious to the development and the integrity of subject-selfhood as a whole. Only when they are organized together and placed in due subordination to the comprehensive system of experience which is the self, can the subject realize the conditions of free and effective action on the plane of spiritual selfhood. To fall short of this is to miss the secret of self-realization, self-determination, self-expression.

How then is self-expression to be attained ? The form of the question of itself suggests the answer, at least in fact.

That something is *to be attained* implies a *process* (perhaps an *effort*) of attainment on the part of the conscious subject. Self-expression does not come unsought, as a spontaneous product of the instinctive life. The instincts are indeed activities (or dispositions to activity). They are activities within the total system of the self, and *in that sense* they may be described as *its* activities. But they are not the self's activities in the true sense unless they are actuated by the energy of the system as a whole. In so far as they are mere local excitements, reactions of subordinate systems to specific forms of stimulation, the relation of the self to them is passive and (in Kantian terminology) pathological. Such excitements of subordinate systems cannot strictly be described as attainments of the self. For here the self is not the subject, but only the object, of the activity in question. What we are dealing with is therefore not true self-expression. The latter is the activity of the subject as such, centrally initiated, centrally received. It is something that has to be achieved *by* the subject, *for* the subject. In the process the self will make use of such media as are available — the motor mechanisms, and the instincts, which are the raw material of human nature — the matrix of personality. But to use the instincts as a medium does not mean to identify the self with them. It does not mean to indulge them without restraint. To do so is to place the self at the mercy of every passing excitation. It is to render the life of the spiritual system dependent upon sensory stimulation. The result is a mode of being which resolves itself into a succession of impulses within an enveloping spiritual milieu. Such a mode of being contains within it a tragic contradiction. It reveals the spirit at war with itself. This can be shown by a further brief consideration of the place of instinct in human life.

As I have said, the instincts are the raw material of human nature, innate dispositions to conscious action upon stimulus, centres of psycho-physical excitement. As such they operate under conditions which are largely physiological, and which relate them to the order of nature and to the system of its laws rather than to the inner realm of spirit.

Impulse follows impulse, upon the appropriate stimulus, very much as event follows event in the natural world. And yet the instincts do not belong exclusively to the order of natural events. They are not merely bodily reactions, but are also states of consciousness, experiences of a conscious subject. Among their components is one which relates them directly to the spiritual mode of being. At the outset, however, the spiritual component in the psycho-physical whole is very much in abeyance. In fact it is little more than a reflection in consciousness of a process which is purely physiological and is physiologically conditioned. The actions of an infant, although accompanied by a vague awareness, are not determined by the latter, but by stimulus, internal or peripheral. The infant does not know *what* he is doing or *why* he is doing it. He has no guiding thoughts, no plan of action, no purposes, methods, ends. The system of his body is not under the control of his mind. This is a corollary to the striking fact (a fact of incalculable ethical significance) that man begins the race of life an almost finished animal organism, but a rudimentary intelligence. In the first stages of his development, therefore, the body is in control of the psycho-physical system. With the passage of the years a gradual inversion of this relationship occurs. As the instincts coalesce in organized structures of correlated activities, their mental components come together into structures which are intrinsically spiritual in their composition and in the principle of their organization. Mind emerges as a quasi-autonomous system, in which the cognitive, affective and conative strains acquire the character of settled dispositions. The spirit is now, potentially at least, in charge of the psycho-physical organism and of all the processes into which consciousness enters as a component.

The question, however, remains : If spirit is now in charge, by what shall *it* be guided in its control of the life-process ? It is here that we enter the region of controversy. The answer of those who constitute themselves the advocates of "self-expression" is that the best guide to conduct is to be found in the natural desires, that the ends of life are identical with the ends of our instinctive tendencies, that

the self is best fulfilled by the gratification of its own deeply-seated impulses.

Now it is true that each of the instincts, each of the associated groups into which they spontaneously organize themselves, carries with it its own peculiar gratification ; and it is possible to make the gratification of our instincts as they arise the principle by which all our activities are directed. In so far as we succeed, life resolves itself into a succession of gratified desires, sustained by purpose and administered by experience. But a gratified desire, or a series of such, however well sustained, however judiciously administered, is a very different thing from a satisfied self. The pleasurable excitement which accompanies the former dies down with the achievement of the object, and has to be renewed. With every repetition we lose something of our freshness, our capacity for enjoyment. The centres of excitement become less active and call for more violent stimuli. To provide these we must spend more and more of our internal resources, our thought, our enterprise, our ingenuity. Thus the higher centres degrade themselves to the service of the lower, and we become the slaves of what is most unstable, most episodic, most impermanent in us. The picture with which we conclude is that of the total system of the self slavishly ministering to its own incidental predicaments in the vain attempt to render itself free and self-sufficient. The policy is vitiated by an inherent contradiction : its success is tantamount to failure.

Surely it is not so that personality can best express itself by bringing into play the hidden powers within it : it is not so that we attain a life of free activity. What, then, is the alternative ? It is commonly assumed by the exponents of " self-expression " that if the instincts are not liberated upon demand, they must be artificially repressed, and that this process is a violation of all that is wholesome and spontaneous in man. The result is that life becomes a system of morbid inhibitions, of forced avoidances and evasions, with the numberless attendant evils that psychology has traced to the unnatural restriction of our organic cravings. Denied the outlet that they seek, and expelled from the

region of our conscious experience, these forces of desire find their way into the unconscious, whence they issue in cunningly disguised forms as the neuroses, to infect the life of the individual with every form of spiritual disease. Meanwhile our social system, reflecting the tendencies of the repressed individual, has raised around us its fabric of approvals and disapprovals, of pretences and hypocrisy, compelling us to live straitened lives in conformity with usage, to conceal our true feelings and to force all our human relations within the framework of lying conventions. These conventions, which are nothing but time-honoured customs, socially imposed and invested with the fictitious sanction of morality, cooperate with a certain propensity in man to self-distrust and servility, in the general ruin of human nature.

It would be vain to deny that certain evils attend certain forms of self-repression ; and if the statement that has just been made were the whole truth, the situation would indeed be desperate. For in that case we should be faced with the alternatives of sacrificing true selfhood to the physiologically conditioned fluxes of the instinctive life or of sacrificing the spontaneity of nature to a soul-destroying morality of negations. Fortunately the alternatives are not exhaustive, and to speak as if they were is to misunderstand the situation altogether. The question at issue is not really that of the liberation or repression of the instincts as such. Clearly the instincts, since they are the raw material of human nature, *must* be released ; and since their unrestricted release is detrimental to the development of a well-integrated personality, they *must* be repressed. Such a contradiction is a sure symptom of misstatement somewhere. It is not difficult to uncover the lurking fallacy.

The contradiction has its source in the tendency to view the instincts as if they were independent things-in-themselves, each with its own peculiar value and sanction. The truth is that they have no independent existence and no private rights. Each of them is a function of the psycho-physical system to which it belongs, and on the mental side, a function of the spiritual system by which it is conditioned and to which it ministers. On this side, as we have seen, the in-

instincts are experiences within a total system of experience, and their significance and value are determined by this fact. Thus they assume one aspect or another according as we view them in themselves or in the light of their relation to the self ; and they vary in their effects with the emotional and volitional contexts in which they occur. It is from this standpoint that the question of their liberation or repression must be considered.

By way of clarifying the whole issue, let us take an example from the emotional life. There are emotions which are an enrichment of life and a fulfilment of selfhood. There are others that are only or mainly injurious excitements. Roughly speaking, these two differ as subordinate systems differ from the system of the whole. An over-excited subordinate system may play havoc with the integrity of the self. It may militate against the organization of the latter and the realization of those qualities which we summarize as " spirituality ". A brief consideration of the development of our emotional life will serve to make the difference clear.

The emotions begin as the affective components in the various instincts. As such they are subject to the conditions, physiological and sensory, under which the instincts become active. With the appropriate stimulus they come to life : they die down when the stimulus is withdrawn. In the process of development they organize themselves together into complex emotional systems, which acquire the force of more or less permanent dispositions. In this way the crude emotions give place to settled sentiments.

Now this process advances *pari passu* with the organization and integration of the cognitive life. Our emotions and sentiments, though in themselves profoundly subjective, have their *objects*, and these objects differ from one another as momentary objects of sensory or perceptual experience (the correlates in conscious experience of physiological stimulation) differ from objects of thought. The former are evanescent and exciting ; the latter have about them a certain universality which enables us to keep them in the mind and to bring them into consciousness independently

of the fluctuations of sensory stimulus. So it is with the corresponding emotions. As percepts give place to concepts, the momentary excitements of instinct give place to organized emotional dispositions. The sentiments, therefore, arise in us by the same process that gives rise to the steady power of thought. We can feel pleasure and pain, fear and anger, desire and aversion in the presence of an actually perceived object ; but in order to love or to revere an object of experience, we must learn to *think* it. When this point is reached we become able to sustain an emotional attitude indefinitely in the physical absence of the object that evolves it. This is a test of personality, a measure of selfhood. It is in such ways that a true self expresses the freedom and unity of its nature. An emotionally developed character is one that has rendered itself independent of the moment-to-moment incitements of sensory experience. The highest level is attained when we find ourselves able to conceive and to sustain a powerful and permanent sentiment towards an object of which we have had no sensory experience at all. This is the crowning possibility of self-expression, and a crowning example of it is to be found in the experience to which the Apostle refers in the great words : " Jesus Christ : *Whom having not seen, ye love.*"

Now the essence of Christian morality is simply this, that it supplies the soul (which is the organized system of our personality) with an object commensurate (and more than commensurate) with the sum total of all the spiritual energies of our nature — cognitive, emotional and conative — when concentrated at the highest point of intensity, expanded to the limit of their development, and integrated into the most perfect system of harmonious selfhood. The knowledge and love of God as revealed in Jesus Christ is a cognitive and emotional experience that so fills the ambit of our being that all the desires, all the impulses of nature in us are organized around one supreme object, and that a spiritual being. Repression there must be, but it is a repression that is incidental to the process of fulfilment. The repressed elements are not forced by mere inhibitory effort into the unconscious, leaving a vacancy in consciousness to be filled by ghostly

revenants. Rather they are extruded by the vital energy of the system in much the same way in which a healthy organism, (it may be to the accompaniment of pain) extrudes a noxious substance ; and the vacant place is filled to overflowing with ampler emotions, deeper and more lasting satisfactions. The self can now express itself with perfect freedom, indeed with a rapture of abandon, not incompatible with a profound peace and with the order of a disciplined existence, because self-expression has been made to rest upon self-realization.

Why Bother About God ?

GEORG MERZ

This unusual theme owes its origin to a story, on account of which I consented to write this article. A leader of the W.S.C.F., who is familiar with the currents within Christianity all over the world, wrote to me of an experience which he had had when he was delivering a series of lectures. A student, I think an Indian, had interrupted the lecture by calling out, " Why bother about God ? " This question had presented the lecturer with a theme which he could not get out of his mind, and he now passed it on to me.

I take up this subject only on a definite assumption : I do not think that this student was an " atheist " in the sense that he simply wanted to accept things as they are, and to get as much enjoyment as possible out of life. No, he obviously recognized the necessity of living *seriously*, of regulating his actions by certain rules of conduct ; (otherwise why should he have gone to a Christian lecture, which has no practical results nor any immediate enjoyment attached to it ?) ; but — " Why bother about God ? " He thinks, in all sincerity, that a solution, a *better* solution, to the problem of life can be found without God, that God is a disturbing, narrowing, annoying factor ; that He is a bad

dream of humanity, a troublesome inheritance from our forefathers.

There is no doubt, that these ideas are today very common. There is searching for "life", "self-expression", "completion", "wealth", "power", "progress", but "Why bother about God?" It is much more to the point to honour *man* and to give him the position to which he is entitled.

It is also true today, that many, even in Christian circles, believe that we can read the Gospel without bothering about the disturbing emotions evoked by the name of God. Jesus is still acknowledged, but He is taken as a teacher and as a master of life. He is the "freest of men" and His word, the Gospel, is a "sign-post to the blessed life", as a German philosopher described it a century ago; this designation is often quoted today, but instead of "blessed" the words "right" or "abundant" are substituted. This conception does not necessarily imply preoccupation with this world alone or the "secularization" of the Gospel. It may include the awareness of something beyond this life on earth: man advances towards perfection step by step, life being linked on to life in one consistent line. But it is an *advance* and there is no interference or limitation by an inexplicable power. It is a process of law and order, cause and effect, finally harmony and perfection. Man is reinstalled in his rightful place. In the name of peace, all disturbance is ruled out; in the name of a sure and well-planned course of life, objection is made to interference; in the name of a quiet sphere of action, every intrusion from outside is rejected. But unrest, disturbance, intrusion come precisely from God. Hence "Why bother about God?"

But is it really possible to read the Gospel and its message in this way, as a sign-post to life? Does man occupy the central place in the teaching of Jesus, and is the word "God" a chance addition? Or does Jesus speak of God in such a way that everything that is said of man must be understood only from the viewpoint of God?

We read at the beginning of the discussion about the Jews' reproach, that Jesus had broken the Sabbath (Mk. II, 27), "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the

Sabbath ". One of Jesus' hearers on this occasion might easily have commented : " Why bother about God ? " Why obey these commandments of God, when they torment instead of encouraging us, when their influence is not broadening but confining, when they crush out life instead of making it more abundant ? But in this instance the law of the Sabbath is not contrasted simply with " man " but with Jesus' healing of men. Jesus has not broken God's commandment, but has given it its proper adjustment. By healing in *God's* name, God is honoured, and in Him man is blessed. No objection is made to God's commandments, but to the way in which men distort and exploit them. The Gospel speaks of God, of His honour and of man's recognition of Him.

We can see this still more clearly in another of Jesus' encounters, that with the rich young ruler (Mk. X, 17-21). The importance of this story for our present purpose comes out in two points : the enthusiastic young man is directed from man towards God : " None is good save God alone " and he is finally called from the fulfilment of the law to a definite surrender, to " the Cross ". It is here that we find the answer to our question. The Cross means " scandal ", that is at the very least discomfort, interference, challenge. It occupies the central position. This challenge is inseparable from the proclamation of God. " Why bother about God ? " So far the student, whose objection formed our point of departure, was perfectly right. *If* God exists, then we cannot hear His word to us without becoming disturbed.

Jesus will not allow the youth's enthusiastic search to confine itself to a human object. " Good Master ! " The rich young ruler believes that his own life has found its perfection in the experience of meeting Jesus, as the great and perfect man, as the one in whom everything contained in human aspiration has found its fulfilment. " Good Master, what must I do ? " But Jesus makes him turn from Himself to God. Fulfilment lies nowhere within human reach, but in God, and in Him alone. Life is not like a circle whose circumference we trace in order to realize

harmony. It is not in such a narrow confinement, but in "openness" that salvation lies. When we remember that man does not live by his own strength, when God's plans cut across our plans, when we recognize and accept our own dependence, then we are approaching the truth of our existence. But this is just what the youth, of whom the Gospel speaks, will not recognize. Just as he believes, in his enthusiastic recognition of Jesus, that he has produced the finest fruits of human insight, so he also believes that through his virtue he has exhibited a perfect achievement. Jesus shatters it to the ground. It is not demanded from us that we should create a beautiful masterpiece, which we can proudly exhibit when it is finished; it is rather demanded that we should acquiesce in the basic recognition, that all our works remain unfinished. Luther has stated this discovery in the confession "All that we do is in vain, even in the best life", thereby respecting the reality of human life and opposing any assumed conceit.

Behind every question "Why bother about God?" there lies real insight. The question might be answered thus: "If you do not bother about God you do not know who you are. You are like those patients who think they are healthy and who avoid a diagnosis by keeping out of the doctor's way". We may think we are finding our life's fulfilment by experiencing the greatness of humanity; we may imagine that through our works we are exhibiting "the good life". But in reality we have missed "the good"; we are living under a spell, we are simply dreamers who fear awaking.

The call of the Bible is the call to awaken from this dream. "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and brethren and sister, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple". These words of Jesus contradict sharply our attempt to regard as the abiding reason for our life either tradition, which we have received from "father and mother", or the spirit of the age in which we live ("brethren and sisters") or that which seems to direct "our own life", (the dynamic force within us). He sharply opposes our idea of creating for our-

selves in this world a final halt and resting-place. We do not reach truth in this way. It is, therefore, impossible to deify the important movements of today, the conservative and the social, the interracial and international movements and the attempts to arrive at healthier forms of life and a new moral order, and to regard service to them as equivalent to the doing of God's will. They bear the same relation to us as the commandments bore to the young ruler. They are not the final word of God. They may become starting-points ; but they do not lead us to the goal unless we let ourselves be carried along by them to a search for God, Who alone is good, and Who completes our imperfection, Who transforms our mere activity into that action which is an appeal to Him to accept us. So Jesus led the youth to face the Majesty of God Himself, in order that, in his poverty and nakedness, he should listen to God's word and tell it forth.

This interference of God in the lives of men does not mean the end of humanity, but rather the re-beginning of a new humanity. The future becomes full of promise. Hence it is not the end of Christianity but rather its beginning, if we have the courage to recognize the shortcomings of our present Christianity both in the narrow personal and in the wide public sphere. We must bring ourselves to recognize the strange fact, that everything on earth is mortal, nothing is brought to perfection. We die, with the best that is in us, and so it is with all things on earth. These are facts to which we can only for a short time close our eyes. But now something quite unusual has happened. It is these very annoyances that God has willed. God and death have entered into a strange alliance. He has Himself taken up the Cross, and with it the " scandal ", sin and death. It is a relationship of an unusual kind. God, Who will not let the works of men come to perfection, Who is ever inflicting fresh wounds and creating unrest, affliction of spirit, apprehension, God Himself voluntarily bears this affliction, is wounded, crucified. " The Cross " means in the Gospel, not only the strange law, which cuts off everything in nature which is beginning to reach perfection ; " the Cross " is also itself a merciful means of salvation.

Jesus Christ is the one Who let Himself be "interfered with" and Who let Himself be forced to take a road quite different from the one which seemed to be designed for Him. "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God... but humbled Himself" (Phil. II, 9). Thus His whole life was a continual response to a Call. His way is not the illusory path of the King, the Hero, the Prophet. He enters the affliction of restriction and darkness. Thus He is able to share in our destiny, our sorrow, our guilt. He takes them upon Himself. Human destiny and its weight of sin are no longer isolated; they have been brought into the life of God Himself.

He spoke to me: "Take My hand, and thou shalt be victorious. I give My whole Self for thee, I will fight for thee. For I am thine and thou art Mine, and thou shalt abide in me and no foe shall pluck thee out of My hand. Though the enemy take My life, yet will I suffer it for thee. My life has overcome death, My purity has borne thy sin, and thou art purified".

Here the question "Why bother about God?" becomes definite resistance, disobedience. Only when we obey, God brings us liberty, joy, peace, that is exactly what man imagines he can create by himself.

He gives us liberty. The man who cries "Why bother about God?" is not free but bound. He wants to ensure that no disturbance shall enter his life, and the effort to achieve this fills him with artificial excitement. He would rightly defend himself, if it were true that we had to guide and form our lives by ourselves. In that case we should have to be always on our guard, for we should be threatened every single hour. But as it is we have the wonderful privilege, that we do not need to worry any longer about our life. The Creator of our life has made Himself responsible for it. Hence we need have no anxiety, but joy and peace. (Phil. IV. 4-7).

By ourselves we can never be free from anxiety. Only in Jesus Christ has this bold message any significance. Therefore it is said that this wisdom "passes all understanding". As long as we try to solve our problems by

thinking alone, we shall be anxious, and we shall wonder in our stupidity why we should add to our worry about so many things the further worry about God. But if we give our thoughts into God's keeping and begin thanking Him, if we stop calculating and begin praying, if we give up defying God and begin supplicating Him ; if, in our prayers and supplications, we reflect on what God has given us, and keep our attention fixed on Him, not turning to right and left, but placing ourselves in His hands and under His protection, then our anxiety disappears ; then we are no longer bound by delusion, but become the liberated prisoners of God. That is the answer to the question, " Why bother about God ? "

Faith in Life and Faith in God as a Moral Basis

TORSTEN BOHLIN

I.

The Swedo-Finnish author Jarl Hemmer describes, in the introduction to his unusual novel *Falliggubens brud* that there was once a youth who passed through a crisis of self-consciousness. Every day he exclaimed, " What am I going to do with my wretched life ? " He felt he was living incompletely, inconsistently. He knew himself incapable of living the only kind of life that he valued — a life that was full and great. For him it was not a question of how to acquire culture, how to share in the material and spiritual development of humanity, for the youth possessed all this. The problem was in culture itself, the incapability of culture to create a full and noble human existence. This youth was full of admiration for the extraordinary development

and improvement of machinery. He admired the aeroplane, driven boldly up into the air by its perfectly-controlled engine. But at the same time this technical perfection filled him with a vague feeling of shame. This question tormented him : why is man himself so inferior to what he creates ? Guided by its pilot, the machine soars into the dizzy heights : but, has the driver of the machine thought of directing his own life, his will, his personality, towards the heights ? This alarming contrast between technique and life is the real problem, because it is evident that every effort to develop culture is meaningless, if the ever-increasing perfection of technique, does not contribute towards making man an Ego, a personality, in the full sense.

This veiled confession is one example among many, how seriously the present crisis of culture affects the individual personality. How different the situation is now from the time — not very long ago — when the western peoples were so intoxicated by the wonderful advance of culture, that they spread the triumphant doctrine : culture is in itself sufficient to open the way to a great and complete personal life, and when religion, especially Christianity, was considered superfluous for the solution of the problem of personality. There was substituted for religion the ambiguous, vague outlook on life, which may be summarized as “ faith in life ” or as radical, cultural idealism. This faith united the various currents of thought of the nineteenth century, first and foremost the scientific theory of evolution, which was transformed by Spencer into a philosophy of life and which has been continued and clarified since by thinkers like Harald Höffding, Friedrich Paulsen and Friedrich Jodl.

Two characteristic features of this attitude are specially important : 1) the strong opposition of this “ faith in life ” to metaphysics and positive religion, especially Christianity ; 2) the belief that the aim, meaning and value of human life, as well as the power of carrying out the highest demands of the personality, are to be sought and found within the limits of life on earth. There is a close relationship between these two features. The opposition to the Christian outlook and the Christian faith is not founded on theoretical ob-

jections, although great efforts are made to point out the uncertainty of the Christian faith and its intellectual difficulties. It is rather based on practical reasons : Christianity is, so to speak, untrue to the earth, to cultural life and to its struggle. It tempts men to squander their best strength on the life beyond. Every religious faith, enthusiasm, and prayer is like a warm spring, which flows uselessly and aimlessly out into an empty, ice-cold universe. What a waste of spiritual energy ! Let this stream instead water the earth, let it be used by that " faith in life " which knows whither it is aiming. Nietzsche's solution is more acceptable : " Sons of the earth, be true to the earth ". Culture is quite capable of satisfying the needs of the idealistic human soul : to the questing mind it offers a rational, consistent purpose ; to the will it offers values, which make life great and complete. Through his own inherent sources of idealism, man is capable of realizing the ideal of universal well-being and harmony, which provides a lofty aim for the struggle of human life. The explanation is quite simple : alongside the selfish, egoistic impulses there are in the human soul sympathetic, social impulses ; the development of culture leads to the gradual strengthening and universalizing of these social impulses. In this way man climbs towards true humanity ; the triumph of disinterestedness raises the individual to the degree of a personality, a spiritually independent Ego.

Have the hopes of this " faith in life " really been fulfilled ? Let us notice, that the problem of the making of personality points to the deepest causes of the present crisis of culture. If one asks the reasons for this crisis, one is answered — the horrible discovery of the brutality of humanity, as revealed by the World War. As soon as the veneer of culture wears thin, one sees naked barbarism beneath ! The contrast is brought home to us between a merely outward culture on one hand and a truly inward culture on the other ; between technique on one hand and meaningful progress on the other ! The latter is by no means necessarily the result of the former. The more man grows away from nature, in the sense of his mastering the forces of nature, the more his freedom seems to eat up its original capital of strength and

vitality. The animal-like, self-centred creature lives on, as in the primitive period of the cave-dwellers and seems only to deteriorate through this power, in the exercise of which he sees his own infinite superiority.

However, such reflections, however ominous, are not yet decisive. It may be answered : humanity has a long way still to go ; we stand only at the beginning. Thus we have the right to hope. But there are more serious objections to this faith in life, which consciously and consistently cuts itself off from living religion. 1) First and foremost : however high the ideals of this " faith in life ", they never reach beyond the bounds of the *transient*. Given that the purpose of life is the well-being and happiness of future generations, and assuming that we would finally succeed in realizing this aim, what task would remain for the final race ? The " final " one, for there must be an end some day ! From this point of view a modern author drastically compares humanity with a layer of mould, which is brushed away from the earth's surface, while the earth itself is whirled on into the icy infinities of space. From this standpoint, is it not a bitter delusion to speak of the " meaning " and " aim " of the long and painful struggle of mankind ? 2) But further : " faith in life " recognizes *no point of Archimedes of all spiritual life*, and cannot do so on the basis of " faith in life ". It would be a contradiction in terms, if this " faith in life " were to recognize the value of anything majestic, absolute and therefore inevitable. Nietzsche's own prophetically profound words may be quoted against this " faith in life " : " You must obey someone, and do so for a long time ; otherwise you founder and lose all your self-respect ". A moral autonomy, which absolutely rejects obedience to all outside forces, is mercilessly doomed to culminate voluntarily or involuntarily in an anarchy of values. Whatever values are chosen — home, motherland, humanity, law, truth, goodness — one can invest them only with an individual, subjective validity. This situation can also be characterized by saying, that thus we lose consciousness of the spiritual unity of mankind. There remain only innumerable, isolated human wills, each with his standard

of good and evil, right and wrong, and it is only a lucky coincidence, a result of similar but variable conditions, if the standards are fairly uniform. If there is no one and nothing, who is to be "obeyed", if there is no power nor control, possessing unlimited holiness and sovereign majesty, what is there that can demand from the individual, in a conflict between self-interest and the good of the community, to restrain his own interests, and to sacrifice the chance sensations of pleasure? 3) Still less does the "faith in life" possess any source of *inspiration* strong enough to turn self-sacrifice into a "strong desire", a free, "flowing", irresistible source of spontaneous action. But the optimistic, progressive theories of "faith in life" rest precisely on the hypothesis, that the individual is willing to sacrifice himself for the common good. Unless we idealize human nature to excess, are we not obliged to recognize how natural it is if the individual, instead of subordinating his own interests to those of the community, comes to the same conclusion as that reached in Voltaire's *Candide*: "Let us leave mankind to its fate and cultivate our own garden in ease and comfort!"

The opinion is growing ever more widespread and more consciously accepted, that "faith in life" makes three grave omissions with regard to the problem of personality. 1) It gives no theory as to the abiding values, by means of which the personality could raise itself beyond the reach of the changes and vicissitudes of natural life. 2) It offers nothing, which will keep the capricious, importunate desires under control. 3) It has no inexhaustible source of inspiration. Recognizing these omissions, modern youth, in its quest for personality, is forced to ask more and more insistently: is not the weakness of "faith in life" really to be found in the fact, that such a faith breaks all connections with the deeper side of existence, with that truth, which men can only reach by way of practical religious development? Is it too much to say, that the crisis of culture results in the demand for something superior to culture, namely in the demand for concrete, living religion? At all events, a change of this kind has been prophesied by critics of culture such as Viatlis Norström in Sweden, Walter Rathenau in

Germany and H. G. Wells in England. Such critics come, from their various points of departure, to one and the same conclusion. They are obliged to recognize, that culture cannot liberate the personality, because culture itself needs liberation. Enthusiasm for culture must be anchored in a moral religious certainty, if it is not to lose all hold. This law which we must obey if we are not to perish, is God, "the invisible King". All outward changes are only means towards one end : the deepening of the personality, setting it free for a full, moral struggle (Rathenau).

But even when it is openly recognized that culture and personality must be liberated by religion, the consequences of this recognition are not always so clearly perceived. Often it is not a really concrete "religion" that is preached, but rather a "religiosity" or an idealism with a religious tinge. The reason for this is, that the courage is lacking to assert the independent reality of the supernatural, or to admit that the divine is a realm on an entirely different, deeper plane from that of culture. This is what constitutes the weakness of Wells' striving for new religious life. One feels as if one were faced with Münchhausen's idea of pulling oneself up by one's own hair ! Culture calls for nothing less than a religion, which will open up to it a new world, an entirely fresh plane of reality. And, consciously or unconsciously, this is, I believe, a call for the Gospel.

II.

In the question of the relationship between the Gospel and the life of the personality, there are three crucial points, which are among the simplest and most elementary of the Christian faith :

1) Culture grows on earthly soil, and has no desire to know any other values than those which spring from the human spirit ; but the Gospel reveals something, which could never arise from human thought or human emotion ; it brings men within reach of the Beyond, which is no limitless, empty space but a living power. This fact certainly entails an inevitable strain between culture and religion. But at

the same time it is just *because* the revelation is inherently different in quality from culture, that it can liberate culture and solve the problem of personal existence. "The strength of the Here lies in the Beyond". The unparalleled basis for the ennoblement of the intellect and for joyous self-sacrifice for others, is and remains a communion with the eternal — the eternal no longer in the sense of an empty idea of limitation but as the creative will, which thinks out every single human life and has a consistent purpose for the struggle of humanity as a whole. This purpose is the Kingdom of God, the sharing in the eternal life of justice and love, which shines from the Gospel.

2) This Kingdom proves itself to be *holy love*. It means contact with the Absolute — the interminable waves of relativity at last reach land ; they find at last something which really *holds firm* ! "Be ye perfect". This "Be" is not a gentle, kindly suggestion ; it is a categorical imperative. "Ye *are* to be perfect !" "Thou *shalt* love !" Love, the freest, most spontaneous thing of all is not secure from the uncertain vacillations of caprice in this world of blind force and impulse, unless it is turned into an irrevocable *commandment*. This divinely simple "Thou shalt" completely breaks down the egocentric in human nature, which makes culture impossible, and which leads to the dissolution of personality.

3) But after the dissolution of personality has been condemned, the balance must of its own accord swing towards "love". The flood rises by unseen influences, the flood-gates are burst open, over the broken weir of self-love the divine love flows free and unrestrained into the barren fields of mankind. "Thou *shalt* love" is now changed into "Thou *shouldst, thou canst, thou canst not do otherwise* !" And when the divine love is able to replace the will of the Ego, so that God Himself lives and loves in man, then occurs the great miracle — the birth of the personality. Submission to the "Thou" of holy love is the birth-hour of the "I".

The essence of personality is the consciousness of a free Ego, which is independent of the different seasons of natural life. As long as man remains in the sphere of culture, he

is doomed to live only on the transitory plane. But contact with the living God gives us a hold on something beyond the transitory, without which our personality cannot live. "God is not a God of the dead" nor of the dying "but of the living". And the Apostle writes, from the depth of his own experience: "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." It is true that this inner peace, this indifference to the world, is obtained only at the cost of our renouncing all right over ourselves. Only in God's service shall we find real freedom.

It would be misleading to leave the matter here. For although submission to the divine may appear like submission as long as we continue to regard ourselves as the centre of our existence, there is nevertheless, even in this self-satisfaction a half-conscious impulse to seek God. This instinct to leave the animal-human behind, this ideal of the personality which presents itself to our mind's eye, shows that our life owes its origin, its independence, its final perfection, to God alone. If we look more deeply into the matter, submission to God is not coercion, but a wonderful gift. The wonderful news of the birth of the personality can, therefore, be summarized once and for all in the paradox, which seems so bold and imperative: "*He who loses his life for My sake, shall find it*". Find — what? The answer is: freedom *from* the hopelessness of transitory things, *from* the degradation of self-satisfaction; freedom *for* an independent, noble life, which is, as it were, a dim reflection of that divine life, whose essence is creative intelligence and perfect holiness.

In the memorable scene from Sardanapal's Funeral Pyre in *Hans Alienus*, the work of the Swedish poet Verner von Heidenstam, we read how the omnipotent King of Nineveh, a worshipper of beauty, but satiated with joy and beauty, had his body burned on a pyre. He seized the magic wax tablets of Hans Alienus, on which nothing could be written that was not true. "I will write down, what is the deepest meaning and purpose of life", said the monarch, "I will write nothing but the truth". But the only word that appeared on the tablet was "I", and even before Hans

Alienus had raised his eyes, this word half disappeared from the soft wax, as if wiped away by an invisible finger, so that only the lower part of the letters remained.

What is the significance of this ? As long as the " I " stands alone — even if surrounded by a wealth of culture — it is only a half-truth, a fragment, which never attains completion and greatness. The *whole* truth " of the deepest meaning and purpose of life " is not " I " but " Thou and I " — our small, transient self, surrounded by the liberating power of the eternal God, which frees us from self-interest, and opens up to us all the noble possibilities of life.

Gesetz und Evangelium als Grundproblem der sittlichen Erneuerung

ALFRED DEDO MÜLLER

Wer der ganzen Tiefe der moralischen Erschütterung ansichtig wird, in der wir stehen, kann nicht anders als die lähmende Resignation begreiflich finden, in der ihr die Menschheit weithin gegenüber steht. Ein katholischer Würdenträger erzählte mir vor einiger Zeit von einem Gastmahl, bei dem er mit einer grossen Anzahl führender Politiker an einer Tafel sass. Der äussere Verlauf der Veranstaltung sei glänzend gewesen ; aber er habe dabei die quälende Frage nicht los werden können : alle diese Männer sind von gestern und heute — wer wird morgen an ihrer Stelle stehen ? Man kann sich daran bildhaft die gegenwärtige Weltlage auf moralischem Gebiet klar machen. Es überstürzen sich die Reformvorschläge. Aber alles, was die Gemüter bewegt, ist von gestern und heute — man weiss nicht, was morgen an seiner Stelle stehen wird.

Die Kirche — es soll im folgenden nur von der protestantischen die Rede sein — ist in diesem Zusammenhang in eigentümlicher Lage. Sie darf stolz darauf sein, dass die Lösungen, die sie anbietet, *nicht* von gestern und heute sind

Dafür aber steht sie unter dem entgegengesetzten Vorwurf : es wird ihr bestritten, dass sie mit diesen Lösungen für das Heute und vollends für das Morgen irgendwelche weiterreichende Bedeutung haben könnte. Diese Situation stellt die Kirche unverkennbar vor die Frage, ob die Grundvorstellungen, in denen sich ihr das moralische Problem darstellt, ihre Gültigkeit auch für die besonderen moralischen Verwicklungen der Gegenwart zu erweisen vermögen. Ueberzeugungskräftig kann diese Frage aber nur so beantwortet werden, dass man untersucht, ob die moralische Krise der Gegenwart nicht vielleicht aus ihrer eigenen Problematik heraus nach den Erklärungsprinzipien und Lösungsversuchen verlangt, die die Kirche anbietet. Diese Frage sei hier in Bezug auf das Verhältnis von Gesetz und Evangelium gestellt.

I.

Zunächst sei ein Blick auf den biblischen Sinn dieser Grundbestimmung geworfen. Er wird am ehesten an der Theologie des Paulus deutlich, die hierfür besonders zukunfts-wichtig geworden ist. Da wäre einmal — und das hat sich dem protestantischen Bewusstsein besonders tief eingeprägt — zu sehen, dass Paulus allem Gesetz von Christus her ein radikales “Nein” entgegengesetzt sieht. Paulus hat hier eine ganz grundlegende und weltgeschichtlich bedeutsame Entdeckung gemacht. Er hat gesehen, dass alles Gesetz auf einem Glauben ruht — entweder an sich selbst, bezw. den Menschen als Gesetzgeber und Vollbringer des Gesetzes, oder an Gott im prophetischen Sinne des Wortes. Er kämpft gegen die Dämonie der Gesetzlichkeit, der er das Judentum seiner Zeit verfallen sieht. Das Gesetz reisst sich darin vom wirklichen Gesetzgeber los. Der Mensch masst sich die Verfügungsgewalt darüber an, schwächt seinen Sinn in fundamentaler Weise ab und bildet sich gleichwohl ein, den ursprünglichen Sinn des Gesetzes erfüllt zu haben. Dem gegenüber besteht der Apostel darauf, dass alle auf sich selbst gestellte Gesetzlichkeit den Zusammenhang mit der letzten Tiefe der Wirklichkeit, den der Mensch verloren hat, nicht wieder herzustellen vermag. Es kann

den Menschen nicht in einen Zustand versetzen, in dem er vor Gott, dem allein möglichen Ursprung aller gesetzlichen Forderung, bestehen könnte. Das Gesetz von Gott losgelöst kann nicht „gerecht machen“. (Gal. 2, 16). Das Gesetz *ist* nicht Gott, es *bedarf* selber Gottes. Es kann nicht erlösen, es bedarf selbst des Erlösers. Rechtfertigung — das ist der Sinn *alles* Gesetzes, handle es sich auch um eine so zeitgebundene Gesetzmäßigkeit, wie das jüdische Zeremonialgesetz sie fordert — gibt es nur in Gott.

Diese Klarheit ist dem Apostel in Christus aufgegangen. Eine doppelte Bedeutung hat für ihn die Begegnung mit dem Erlöser. Einmal offenbart sich in ihm der eigentliche Sinn des Gesetzes. Es wird nun erst recht deutlich, was es heisst, dass es sich um das „Gesetz Gottes“ handelt (Röm. 7, 22). „Das Gesetz ist heilig, gerecht und gut“ (Röm. 7, 12). Erst wenn das Gesetz so aller Verfügungsgewalt des Menschen entzogen und ganz auf die Seite Gottes gestellt ist, kann die *zweite* grosse Einsicht aufgehen, die Paulus in Christus gewinnt: der unversöhnliche Widerspruch des Menschen gegen das wahrhaft ernstgenommene Gesetz. Der Mensch erträgt den Anblick wirklicher Erfüllung einfach nicht. Er sieht sich dadurch um seine letzte und feinste Sicherung und Beruhigung von unten her gebracht. Deshalb bringt der Mensch den wirklichen Erfüller ans Kreuz. Dieses „Gehorsam bis zum Tode, ja bis zum Tode am Kreuz“ (Phil. 2, 8) bedeutet darum den Wendepunkt in aller Stellung der Menschheit zum Gesetz. Am Kreuz tritt die Majestät, aber auch die Dämonie des Gesetzes, sein göttlicher Ursprung, aber auch seine Umbiegung durch den Menschen in unüberbietbarer Klarheit hervor. In solcher grellen Enthüllung seines letzten Ursprungs wie seiner letzten Konsequenzen aber wird auch der „Fluch des Gesetzes“ aufgehoben (Gal. 3, 13).

Dieser radikalen Entwertung des Gesetzes, dem somit unter allen Umständen der Charakter einer letzten Hilfe genommen ist, steht nun aber — und das ist vom neueren Protestantismus nicht in derselben Deutlichkeit gesehen worden — eine nicht minder radikale *Sinngebung* gegenüber. Auch sie wird erst in Christus möglich. Er selbst hat ja

das Gesetz erfüllt, er war „gehorsam bis zum Tode am Kreuz“, und so lässt denn auch erst das vor keiner Konsequenz zurückschreckende Ernstnehmen des Gesetzes den Blick für die erlösende Kraft Christi gewinnen. Das Gesetz ist ein „Zuchtmeister auf Christus“. Nur wer das Gesetz bis zum Letzten schwer nimmt, lernt den wahren Charakter und die wahre Lage des Menschen begreifen — so wie sie Paulus an sich selbst beschrieben hat: „Ich finde in mir ein Gesetz, der ich will das Gute tun, dass mir das Böse anhangt.... Ich elender Mensch, wer wird mich erlösen von dem Leibe dieses Todes? Ich danke Gott durch Jesum Christum unseren Herrn“ (Röm. 7, 21-27). Diese pädagogisch vorbereitende Wirkung ist die eine bleibende Bedeutung des Gesetzes. Die andere ist die, dass es *Ausdruck* und *Gleichnis* ist für den in Christus in voller Klarheit hervorgetretenen Gotteswillen. Das wird besonders deutlich an der Art, wie in Römer 13 im Anschluss an ganz konkrete Weisungen über das Verhältnis zur Obrigkeit die Liebe als der ewige Sinn aller gesetzlichen Forderung bezeichnet wird. (Röm. 13, 9-10).

Diese Auffassung des Paulus gewinnt umso höhere Bedeutung, als sie der Anschauung Jesu selbst vom bleibenden Sinn des Gesetzes durchaus entspricht. Es sei nur an die zwei Worte erinnert: „Ihr sollt nicht wähnen, dass ich gekommen bin, das Gesetz und die Propheten aufzulösen; ich bin nicht gekommen aufzulösen, sondern zu erfüllen“ (Matth. 5, 17), und an das Doppelgebot: „Du sollst lieben Gott, deinen Herrn und deinen Nächsten wie dich selbst. In diesen zwei Geboten hängt das ganze Gesetz und die Propheten“ (Matth. 22, 37-40).

Die Auffassung des Neuen Testaments von dem Verhältnis zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium lässt sich so etwa in folgenden Sätzen zusammenfassen: 1. Der letzte und für alle Zeiten gültige tragende Grund und Sinn alles Seins und Handelns tritt im Evangelium hervor, wie es in Jesu Leben und Lehre enthalten ist. 2. Das Evangelium nimmt allem Gesetz den Charakter einer letzten, in sich ruhenden Lebensgrundlage und entwertet und begrenzt es insofern radikal, sowohl seinem Inhalt, wie seiner zeitlichen Gültig-

keit nach. 3. Zugleich gibt es damit aller am Liebesgebot des Evangeliums zu orientierenden und in ihm zu begründenden gesetzlichen Forderung einen bleibenden, in immer neuer Ausprägung zu gewinnenden Sinn. Das Gesetz hat nur Sinn als Mittel zum Zweck. Es verhilft dem letzten Sinn des Evangeliums zu immer neuer Konkretisierung und Verwirklichung. Einmal bezeichnet es die konkrete Lage, in der das Evangelium den Menschen trifft, erschüttert ihn, öffnet ihm die Augen über sich selbst und bereitet ihn so auf die wirkliche Begegnung mit dem lebendigen Christus vor, und dann wird es zum Ausdruck für den konkreten Gehorsam gegen Gott, zu dem alle Verkündigung des Evangeliums den Menschen aufrufen und ermächtigen will.

II.

Aus Raumgründen muss hier davon abgesehen werden, in der gleichen Ausführlichkeit, in der von Paulus die Rede war, von Luther zu reden. Es sei also nur daran erinnert, dass Luther eben diese Lösungen des Apostels neu entdeckte, weil auch er das Gesetz wirklich schwer nahm, und dass er sich dem Katholizismus seiner Zeit gegenüber in derselben Lage fand, in der der Heidenapostel dem Judentum seiner Tage gegenüber gestanden hatte. Im übrigen sei hier gleich die Frage gestellt: bewähren sich diese Gedanken auch der heutigen moralischen Ratlosigkeit gegenüber und in welchem Sinne?

Da wird nun zunächst einmal die ganze Schwere der Erschütterung, in der wir stehen, daran deutlich, dass heute beides, Gesetz und Evangelium, unsicher geworden ist. Das ist eine ganz neue und schwere Lage. Paulus und Luther vollzogen ihre Kritik an einem moralischen Zustand, der selbst religiös orientiert sein wollte. Ein tieferes Wissen um Gott trat hier also gegen eine religiöse Verflachung auf, die doch wenigstens nicht alle Möglichkeiten der Verständigung ausschloss. Heute will die Moralität, der wir gegenüber stehen, weithin überhaupt nichts mehr von einem religiösen Ursprung wissen. Und damit ist auch allem Wissen um eine letzte Offenbarung Gottes, wie es doch das Evangelium Christi bringen will, zum mindesten der Stempel des Proble-

matischen aufgedrückt, wenn es nicht einfach problemlos als einer vergangenen Stufe der Menschheit angehörig empfunden wird.

Zugleich aber tut sich nun in dieser scheinbar ganz hoffnungslosen Lage eine ganz überraschende Perspektive auf: die beiden Phänomene, Gesetz und Evangelium, stellen sich in säkularisierter, freilich dem Bewusstsein meist ganz verhüllter Form dar und erweisen so ihren Fundamentalcharakter in ganz neuem Lichte.

Zunächst haben wir unzweifelhaft eine *verweltlichte Gesetzlichkeit*. Der Kreis von Menschen, der sich in seiner moralischen Leistung noch ausdrücklich von der Religion her bestimmen lässt, ist auf das Ganze auch nur der westeuropäischen Menschheit gesehen sicherlich nicht mehr gross. Gleichwohl vollbringt die moderne Menschheit eine gesetzliche Leistung ungeheurer Art. Es braucht dabei nur an die gewaltigen Energien gedacht zu werden, von denen das staatliche Leben des Abendlandes erfüllt ist, und an die unerhörte Willensanspannung, die in der modernen Arbeitskultur und in der Weltwirtschaft ihren Ausdruck findet. Das Leben des modernen Menschen gewinnt damit eine gesetzliche Formung, die in ihrer Art ebenso tief in die innere Welt hineinreicht wie die kirchliche Lebensordnung des Mittelalters.

Wenn dies verhältnismässig leicht fassbar ist, so mag die andere Behauptung zunächst sonderbar anmuten, dass dieser Gesetzlichkeit auch eine Art säkularisierten Evangeliums gegenüber stehe. Es muss dann freilich dem Begriffspaar Gesetz und Evangelium die Weite wiedergegeben werden, die es bei Paulus und zweifellos auch bei Luther hat, die darin eine *Grundordnung aller Weltgestaltung* ausgesprochen fanden. So gesehen liegt nun aber unzweifelhaft aller säkularisierten Gesetzlichkeit unserer Tage eine Gläubigkeit zu Grunde, die alle die Erfüllungen, die Paulus und Luther im Evangelium Christi und in Gott fanden, in der Hingabe an die Welt, hier den Staat, dort die Wirtschaft, die Wissenschaft oder einen anderen irdischen Wert gewinnen will. Diese Beziehung tritt aber dann vor allem darin hervor, dass gegen alle positive, geschichtlich gegebene Gesetzlich-

keit der bezeichneten weltlichen Art sich in unseren Tagen aus einer Art unmittelbarer Weltgläubigkeit heraus auch ein Protest erhebt, der alle formalen, strukturellen, wesensmässigen Eigentümlichkeiten jenes in Paulus vom Evangelium her in ertümlicher Form vorgebrachten Protestes in sich trägt. Er tritt, was die Sphäre der öffentlichen Lebensgestaltung betrifft, besonders deutlich im Faschismus, bezw. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, bezw. Kommunismus, in der Sphäre der persönlichen Lebensgestaltung, um hier nur ein Beispiel zu nennen, in vielen Aeusserungen der Bewegung für Sexualreform hervor. Zweifellos gehen alle diese Protestbewegungen von einer unmittelbaren Gläubigkeit aus, hier an Staat, Rasse oder Klasse, dort an die vitalen Werte des Lebens, besonders die Sexualität. Diese Gläubigkeit glaubt sich im Zusammenhang mit der letzten Tiefe der Wirklichkeit und richtet sich gegen eine Gesetzlichkeit, die als unlebendig und aller tieferen Lebenserfüllung feindlich aufgefasst wird. Nur als Ausdruck einer solchen weltwärts gerichteten Gläubigkeit werden der Enthusiasmus und der Opferwille verständlich, die in allen Bewegungen dieser Art wirksam sind.

III.

Diese Lage stellt die evangelische Kirche nun vor eine ungeheure Aufgabe. Grundsätzlich geredet, kann nur die in den Grunderfahrungen der Reformation wieder lebendig gewordene Urbeziehung zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium, wie Paulus sie zu weltgeschichtlicher Bedeutung gebracht hat, die ungeheure Krise lösen, in der wir stehen. Zugleich aber ist die empirische Kirche reformatorischer Prägung selbst so tief in die Krise verwickelt und darum so machtlos, dass, menschlich geredet, nicht einzusehen ist, wie von da aus Hilfe kommen soll. Nun kann es solch unerhörter Verwicklung gegenüber natürlich durchaus sein, dass die empirischen Kirchen endgültig versagen und von Gott verworfen werden. Das aber ist eine ewige Situation, in der alles Menschliche, und so auch die Kirchen, dauernd vor Gott stehen. Sie enthebt uns keinen Augenblick der Aufgabe, die im Grundansatz des protestantischen Kirchentums ent-

haltene Urbeziehung zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium nach allen Kräften zur Geltung zu bringen. Das kann nur so geschehen, dass die Versuchung deutlich gesehen wird, der die protestantischen Kirchen, namentlich lutherischer Prägung, in besonderem Masse ausgesetzt sind. Sie besteht darin, dass die ganze Sphäre der Gesetzlichkeit aus dem inneren Zusammenhang mit dem Evangelium entlassen wird. Sie muss sich gerade dort einstellen, wo das Evangelium in seiner ganzen Majestät vor das innere Auge tritt, und somit ganz streng als das ewige Urteil über alles menschliche Tun anerkannt wird. Gesetzlichkeit *aller* Art kann dann leicht als der Versuch des Menschen empfunden werden, doch noch *Gott gegenüber*, statt ganz allein *von Gott her* gerechtfertigt dazustehen. So allein ist die ganze Emanzipation der neueren Kultur vom Christentum möglich gewesen. Alle Kulturgestaltung vollzieht sich in der Sphäre der Gesetzlichkeit. Die Entlassung der Kultur aus der kirchlichen Seelsorge war somit gleichbedeutend mit der Abspaltung des Gesetzes vom Evangelium. Das entsprach selbstverständlich nicht einer ausgesprochenen Absicht. Es stand unzweifelhaft im Widerspruch mit der eigentlichen Meinung der Reformatoren. Luther nahm in seinen Katechismus ausdrücklich die zehn Gebote auf und behandelte in seinen Schriften aus seiner theologischen Verantwortung heraus immer wieder die grossen Fragen der Kulturgestaltung. Späterhin aber schrumpfte das Problem Gesetz und Evangelium immer mehr zu einer innertheologischen Spezialbestimmung zusammen, die den Weltmenschen nicht mehr zu beschäftigen oder gar zu beunruhigen brauchte. Das sprach sich besonders deutlich darin aus, dass man in der lutherischen Dogmatik vom 17. Jahrhundert an das *ministerium ecclesiasticum* dem *magistratus politicus* und dem *status oeconomicus* einfach *koordiniert* sein liess: die Kirche verkündigte danach das *Evangelium* und sprach vom *Gesetz* nur noch insoweit, als es einige wichtige, schon im Wortlaut der Bibel deutlich hervorgehobene Punkte der *persönlichen Lebensgestaltung* betraf; die grundlegenden Berufe aber, denen die *Weltgestaltung im Grossen* oblag, sahen sich nun aus aller seelsorgerlichen Ueberwachung der Kirche entlassen,

einer Gesetzmäßigkeit ausgeliefert, die in keinem erkennbaren Zusammenhang mehr mit dem Evangelium stand. Das Ergebnis dieser Aufteilung dieser Sphären *konnte* nur der moderne Weltzustand sein.

Es scheint uns nun ganz deutlich, dass dieser Zustand durch eine neue Verkündigung des Evangeliums von Christus nur dann erschüttert werden kann, wenn diese auch dem Gesetz jene Doppelbedeutung wiedergibt, die es bei Paulus hat. Das sei hier noch einmal vom Problem der Konkretheit aus erläutert, auf das schon hingewiesen wurde. Man darf vielleicht sagen: im Zusammenstoß und im Zusammenhang mit dem Gesetz wird das Evangelium konkret. Es realisiert sich als Begrenzung und Sinnerfüllung, als Ende und Wiedergeburt des Gesetzes. Das Evangelium setzt immer eine gesetzliche Forderung voraus und setzt immer eine gesetzliche Forderung aus sich heraus. Es ist immer radikale Entwertung und Sinnerfüllung des Gesetzes zugleich. Es kann immer nur verstanden werden als Beziehung auf ein konkretes Sein und Tun des Menschen, der darin erschüttert und zu neuem Leben geboren wird. An einigen Beispielen mag dieser Zusammenhang wenigstens in Andeutungen erläutert werden.

Was kann einem Geschlecht das Wort von der Vergebung bedeuten, das in geschlechtlichen Dingen ohne alle wirklich verpflichtende gesetzliche Normierung lebt? Damit ist nicht bestritten, dass es auch heute noch Einzelne gibt, die an der Unerfüllbarkeit der sexual-moralischen Forderungen christlicher Prägung zerbrechen und dann in den paulinischen Schrei nach Erlösung ausbrechen. Charakteristisch für unser Zeitalter sind diese Einzelnen zweifellos nicht. Wir wissen schon warum: die moderne Sexualphilosophie weiss sich selbst durch ein Evangelium von aller überkommenen Gesetzmäßigkeit entbunden — das Evangelium der sexuellen Erfüllung. Sie lässt von da aus auch den Vorwurf der Gesetzlosigkeit gar nicht gelten. Unbestreitbar setzt diese neue Gläubigkeit auch eine neue gesetzliche Konkretheit aus sich heraus. Kein überzeugter Sexualreformer, etwa kommunistischer Herkunft, wird sich der einfachen Gesetzlosigkeit bezichtigen lassen. Vielmehr wird hier ja gerade umgekehrt der christ-

lichen Moral eine Verfälschung des moralischen Empfindens vorgeworfen. Ihr wird die Schuld an jener bürgerlichen Doppelmoral aufgeladen, die, bei offizieller Anerkennung der Einhe, das Verhältniswesen und die Prostitution hat entstehen lassen. Sie wird der Blindheit gegenüber den verheerenden Wirkungen unmenschlicher Wohnungsverhältnisse, und der Lieblosigkeit gegenüber dem unehelichen Kinde bezichtigt. Diese Haltung wird sich nur durch ein Evangelium erschüttern lassen, das allen Lebenshunger in sich aufzunehmen vermag, der sich hier in die sinnliche Erregung verloren hat, und das diesen seinen inneren Reichtum in einer neuen lebensbezogenen Gesetzlichkeit konkret werden lässt, in der alle jene Anliegen ganz ernst genommen sind, die der Gegenseite das Recht zu ihrem Pathos geben. Es muss deutlich werden, dass auch hier wirklich *die Liebe alles Gesetzes Erfüllung* ist, und dass alle gesetzliche Regelung in sexueller Beziehung nichts anderes sein kann als einmal Vorbereitung und dann gleichnishafter Ausdruck für jene tiefste geistige Beziehung zwischen dem Ich und dem Du, die im Neuen Testament im Gebot der Nächstenliebe ihren ewigen Ausdruck gefunden hat.

Ebenso ist es in Bezug auf die politisch-soziale Sphäre. Wie kann sich ein Geschlecht von der Verkündigung des Evangeliums getroffen fühlen, das ganz von einem Glauben an die letzte Sinnhaftigkeit irdischer Machtgewinnung erfüllt ist, der sie mit allen Wonnen und Verheissungen überrauscht, die der Mensch bei voller Selbstbesinnung nur in Gott sucht, und der zugleich ein Ethos erzeugt, dem gegenüber die Forderungen der Kirche matt und lebensfremd erscheinen? Man vergegenwärtige sich nur auf der einen Seite die mächtige Inbrunst, mit der etwa Thomas Carlyle seinem Jahrhundert das Evangelium der Arbeit verkündigt und dann das Selbstbewusstsein, mit der die politischen Extreme unserer Tage ständig an die Blutopfer erinnern, die sie für ihre Ueberzeugungen zu bringen bereit seien, und die sie auch wirklich bringen. Oder man denke an das ungeheure, in seiner Weltbedeutung noch längst nicht begriffene Blutopfer, das das Staatsbewusstsein aller Nationen im Weltkrieg brachte. Alle rein abstrakte Verkündigung des Evangeliums wird hier

von den leidenschaftlichen Einflüsterungen übertönt werden, die aus der gewaltigen Steigerung menschlicher Energien kommt. Die Erschütterung, wie sie Paulus über die jüdische Gesetzhaltigkeit seiner Tage und Luther über den Katholizismus seiner Zeit brachte, kann über die aus einer säkularisierten Gläubigkeit entsprungene Gesetzhaltigkeit der Gegenwart nur so kommen, dass das Evangelium selbst wieder gesetzliche Konkretheit gewinnt. Soll unserer Zeit neu erkennbar werden, dass Christus in der Tat die Macht ist, der alle Gewalt im Himmel und auf Erden übergeben ist und die "gesetzt ist über alle Gewalt, Macht, Fürstentümer nicht allein in dieser Welt, sondern auch in der zukünftigen" (Eph. 1, 21), dann muss deutlich werden, dass diese Theologie auch ein politisches Ethos aus sich hervorzubringen vermag, in dem alle konkreten Tatbestände der politischen Verantwortung des Menschen berücksichtigt und verarbeitet sind und das wieder Ausdruck der Gewissheit ist, dass Christus „auch für die Staaten gestorben“ ist (Adam Müller in *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, 1809, neu herausgegeben Wien — Leipzig, 1922).

Wie einschneidend diese Erkenntnisse sind, mag zum Schluss an einer polemischen Wendung deutlich werden, die da unvermeidlich wird, wo die Liebe wirklich ganz ernsthaft als Erfüllung und Masstab jeder Art von Gesetz verstanden wird: *Eine ihres Auftrages ganz gewisse Kirche kann keine Gesetzhaltigkeit, sie zeige sich, wo sie wolle, unwidersprochen in Geltung lassen*, die nicht einmal als „Zuchtmeister auf Christus“ und dann als gleichnishafter Ausdruck für den konkreten Gehorsam gegen ihn verstanden werden kann. Dieser Widerspruch wird, also allgemein geredet, überall dort laut werden müssen, wo einer Gesetzhaltigkeit unerkannte oder zugegebene Ueberwertungen, Verabsolutierungen, Vergötterungen zu Grunde liegen, mögen sie Sexualität, Staat, Wirtschaft, Rasse, oder irgendein anderes irdisches Wertgut betreffen. Das Schicksal der Welt hängt davon ab, dass wieder anerkannt wird, dass *Christus aller* gesetzlichen Leistung der Menschheit *Herr und Richter* ist.

THE STUDENT WORLD CHRONICLE

The Death of Mr. K. T. Paul

The death of Mr. K. T. Paul, once a Vice-President of the Federation, removes from the ranks of Indian Christian leaders one who gave both to the Church and the country generally preeminent service. Born in South India in 1875, of Christian parents, Mr. Paul was educated at the Madras Christian College, then under the Principalship of the Rev. Wm. Miller of the Free Church of Scotland. After graduation, he was appointed to a lectureship in his old college. In those days Christian colleges in India gave little opportunity for Indian Christian leadership, and before long Mr. Paul found other means for expression of those great gifts with which he was so richly endowed. He became an organizing secretary of the newly founded National Missionary Society, but before many years had elapsed was called to be the first Indian National General Secretary of the Y.M.C.A. of India. On the outbreak of the war he undertook the responsibility for initiating and carrying through those gigantic enterprises undertaken by the Indian Y.M.C.A. for Welfare Service to Indian Soldiers in the various overseas expeditionary forces, in India itself. During these years and later he developed a unique form of rural service, primarily for Christian village folk. So successful did this prove that the Y.M.C.A. example was followed by many other Christian bodies.

During these years of pioneering and adventuring, in the field of welfare service, Mr. Paul made in addition a unique contribution to the problems of Church Union. As moderator of the South India United Church, and as a member of its Committees on Church Union, he helped to carry on for a number of years successful negotiations with the Anglican Church in India. Last year Mr. Paul resigned from the Y.M.C.A. and threw himself into public life. He was invited by the Viceroy to be one of the Indian Christian representatives at the Round Table Conference. In London he very soon made a place for himself, by his sincerity and understanding of the mentality of the British people. Unfortunately a London winter proved too much for him. He had to leave before the proceedings of the Conference were completed, and he returned to India very seriously ill. He passed away at his home in Salem on April 11th.

Although the nexus binding the Student Movement in India and the Y.M.C.A. was dissolved twenty years ago the latter organization could not transfer its whole responsibility for student work to the former. The Indian Y.M.C.A. had its institutions such as student hostels which have continued to cooperate on behalf of large numbers of non-Christian students. To these institutions Mr. Paul gave a great deal of his attention, for he realized how important their continued existence was for the welfare of students generally. In his old university city, Madras, he experimented in later years through the agency of the Y.M.C.A. with interesting student groups in the problems of rural reconstruction. Under his inspiration a large number of valuable surveys of villages were undertaken and village programmes drawn up.

Mr. Paul took a very prominent share in several of the Federation's General Committee meetings. Among others he was present at Nyborg Strand, 1926 and Mysore 1928, as well as at the Executive Committee meeting at Lake Mohonk 1927. He was very largely responsible for the arrangements of the Mysore meeting and it is owing to his personal influence that the Maharajah's officers suggested to His Highness to offer hospitality to the Federation.

It was in the production of books that Mr. Paul showed a peculiar interest. Several series of books on the rural problems and educational problems were planned by him and are being carried out, in a manner that brings great credit to him as a person of vision. He realized that the particular needs of the poor and in India of the rural poor were of the profoundest importance and clamant in their demand for solution. Suggestions have been made that Mr. Paul's services should be recognized by some form of memorial. What could better keep his memory green than the establishment of a foundation which would keep the Christian intellectuals in India in touch with the overwhelming problems of rural life so as to lead the Church into a wide reconstructive effort ?

The Student Christian Movement in China

The China Year Book for 1931 carries an article by Y. T. Wu, secretary of the Student Division of the Chinese Y.M.C.A., which gives an extraordinarily lucid and interesting interpretation of the spiritual situation among Chinese students. We quote the section on the student Christian movement :

"Side by side with the quietly working anti-Christian movement, we find the growth of Christian influences among students along two lines : (a) A revival of interest in religious matters among certain non-Christian students and (b) a revitalized faith and a new life among Christian students.

Of the first, there is yet very little to be said. We notice the revival of some Bible classes for Government school students ; we find that scholarly Christian thinkers like Canon Streeter are able to get an intelligent and eager hearing from among non-Christian students ; we notice more openness of mind and less blind prejudice among the true seekers.

That this should be the case in a time when Marxian atheism and scientific naturalism hold such sway over students' minds needs a word of explanation. As we have noted before, the spirit of revolt among youth, that set in after the world war, has called into question old institutions, morals, and ways of thinking. In China, the Renaissance movement has been a movement of criticism and iconoclasm. The net result of this intellectual revolution is a void left in the mind and heart of students. The building up has not been able to keep pace with the pulling down. But man, much less youth, cannot live in a state of intellectual and spiritual chaos. The quest must go on, and when it goes on in earnest, it breaks the bounds of prejudice and welcomes light that may come in from any unexpected source.

The Communistic way of social reform, with its method of violence and terrorism, its appeal to hatred rather than to love, is repelling to a certain type of mind and temperament. To this class the way of life represented in the personality of Jesus — the combination of severity with tenderness, of radicalism with insight into human nature — seems to offer a more adequate solution to our social problems.

Let us take up next the second line of growth in Christian influence — the revitalized faith and the new life among Christian students.

The anti-Christian movement and other new forces in the social and intellectual fields had a purging effect on the Christian students. A certain number of them fell away, but those that have remained in the Christian fellowship have emerged with strength, vitality and a hardihood born of years of trials. The story of how handfuls of Christian students in nine Government universities in a certain city fought their way through opposition and derision and succeeded in creating an intercollegiate Christian fellowship, is inspiring as well as thrilling. They had first to put up posters to find out just who

were the Christians in each university. These were torn down immediately by the opposing students. Both sides repeated their respective acts once, twice, thrice... until the Christians finally won out by sheer patience. The fellowship held their weekly service in a poorly-equipped room, but in excellent spirit. We can cite many other instances where the Christian students have shown a new life.

The awakening of the Christian students may be described along three lines :

1. *Reconstruction of religious faith.* This has been going on for some years. While the process is a disturbing one, it cannot but have its wholesome effect. The emphasis seems to be on the inductive and empirical approach rather than the deductive and authoritarian. It is the application of the scientific spirit in religion. Although the influence of Humanism has hardly been felt among Christian students, yet one would suspect certain of its tenets to fit in with the present trend.

2. *Religion as a social force.* The central emphasis of the secular movements, particularly the Communists, is on social reconstruction. A similar emphasis has been noticed among the Christian students. The position of aloofness to social problems is no longer tenable. While former social activities of Christian students were more or less sporadic and philanthropic in nature, they have now taken the form of life service and life dedication. Many students have pledged themselves to improve the life of the rural people. Kagawa, the Japanese social reformer, has been received with great enthusiasm. The conviction is gaining that religion does not exist where it does not exhibit itself as a social force.

3. *The deepening of the religious life.* In the past there were various kinds of student organizations. The most prominent of these was the student Y.M.C.A. It used to be a highly organized body with an elaborate program. Now the emphasis has been shifted to smaller groups, in the form of fellowships either within the larger organization or as separate bodies. The primary purpose of fellowships is the deepening of the spiritual life, an end more difficult of attainment in the larger organizations with their less intimate personalities. At present there seems to be a tendency to push the emphasis one step further and to bring back to us what may be called personal religion. This is by no means in antithesis to the emphasis on religion as a social force. It is felt that unless our life is firmly grounded in a religion that is constantly nourished by communion with the object of our faith, thus producing vitality

and poise, outward religious expressions are apt to be weak and superficial. Personal evangelism, once neglected, may be revived in a new form as one of the vital prerequisites for a program of social reconstruction.

Experience in recent student conferences shows that worship again occupies a central place. The æsthetic element is emphasized. Symbolism and the method of silence seem to have come as a new discovery and to have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of common worship. There is a place for both mysticism and the scientific attitude.

These various tendencies among Christian students are gathered up and embodied in the proposal for a National Student Christian Movement. Broadly speaking, the movement is already here. What is further needed is an efficient central organization, locally as well as nationally, whereby the present more or less inarticulate aspirations and the sense of solidarity may find an adequate expression. The Y.M.C.A. Convention in 1926, together with the national bodies of the Y.W.C.A. and the Student Volunteer Movement, appointed a Student Commission to study this problem. Another commission was appointed in 1929 in a similar way. The purpose of the student Christian movement, as worked out by the Commission, is as follows :

“ In the spirit of Jesus, to create fellowships of youth and to build sound character, with a view to the emancipation and development of the life of the people ”.

Here again we find the social emphasis at the centre of the purpose.

It is not probable that the student Christian movement will separate with the Y.M.C.A. movement of which it has been an integral part for over thirty years. So long as student initiative and expression are given their proper place, it is most desirable that the two should share with each other their ideals, their struggles, and their resources.

The consideration of organization will also involve due attention to the demand for the coming together of men and women in the student Christian movement. Separation of the two, at least in the functional sense, is no longer possible ”.

The Divisions in the Russian Church Abroad

The only important division in the history of the Russian Church took place in the XVIIIth century, when the state supported the Patriarch Nihon in his correction of the mistakes in the service books which had crept in during centuries of copying by hand. A certain number of the faithful refused to accept these revisions and similar "innovations" of the Patriarch, and declared that only those were Orthodox who shared this conservative attitude. These "Old Believers" were from time to time persecuted by the tsars and the established Church, and only in the present century were the respective attitudes modified and steps taken towards healing the breach.

The Revolution has now given birth to a new schism — ostensibly between the Church in Russia and the emigrant Church, but in reality cutting horizontally through both. This division has nothing to do with the "Renovated Church", so-called, which began as an attempt at reformation but soon revamped its doctrinal ideals and liturgical forms to conform to Orthodoxy, and is now schismatic largely because of irreconcilable personalities and because of its unwillingness to repent its highly questionable methods of gaining and holding administration over a part of the Church. It may be considered an evidence of the inner unity and strength of the Church that the present difficulty has not arisen over questions of belief or even on matters of discipline, in the ordinary sense. There are none of the factors which contributed to the Protestant Reformation. The root of the present struggle lies in the confusion caused by the political and social revolution of 1917, and not in any fundamental way in ecclesiastical conceptions.

For purposes of general orientation, we may note the following personalities and groups involved in the new situation: (1) The Metropolitan Peter of Krutitsk, appointed by the Patriarch Tikhon as his temporary successor, pending election of a new Patriarch by the Church Council. Peter has been in exile, mainly in Siberia, for nearly five years; there was no one fully accredited with the functions of the Patriarch from the date of Peter's arrest until the Concordat with the government in 1927. (2) This was achieved by Metropolitan Sergius of Nijni Novgorod, appointed by Peter as his vicar. (3) There were other bishops who objected to Sergius' appointment and who have refused to acknowledge his authority, these, with their following, forming the so-called "opposition"

group in the Church in the U.S.S.R. (4) The Synod of emigrant bishops, established in 1921, headed by the Metropolitan Anthony of Kiev, and having its seat in Sremsky Karlovtsi, Yougoslavia, hence generally referred to as the "Karlovtsi" group. (5) The Metropolitan Eulogius, appointed by the Patriarch Tikhon in 1922 to be chief administrator of the Russian Orthodox parishes in Western Europe, having his residence in Paris. (6) The Metropolitan Eleutherius of Kowno (and Vilna), who appears on the scene only in 1931 and then merely as representative of the Metropolitan Sergius in dealing with emigrant Church affairs.

All of these accept the Metropolitan Peter as titular and spiritual head of the Russian Church. Peter himself never fully functioned as the administrative head of the Church, so his attitude on emigrant matters is unknown, if indeed he is informed about them; there is documentary evidence of his appointing Sergius, but it is reported that he does not share Sergius' position on many matters. Sergius is legally the head of the administration of the Patriarchal Orthodox Church in Russia. The "opposition" stand generally for Peter, but against Sergius, for reasons which will be given; they have much in common with the Karlovtsi in their general orientation, and now also with Eulogius in the particular matter of attitude toward Sergius. Thus we may diagrammatically picture as the head of the Church, with two rival sections — Sergius and the "opposition". The emigrant Church loyal to Sergius is under Eleutherius and his appointee in Paris, Bishop Benjamin of Sevastopol; the "opposition" is reflected abroad by Karlovtsi and Eulogius; but Benjamin, Karlovtsi and Eulogius are in triangular mutual antagonism.

This sketch should make it clear that the centre of conflict is really within the body of the Church in Russia, the splitting off of the emigrant Church being only a side-issue in the struggle. The "opposition" is not easily defined in character or extent, because it is more a mood or attitude than an organized group, though it embraces bishops and clergy in active service. One may assume that it is fairly widespread among the people, and it is known to include many of the imprisoned bishops and priests. In fact there exists the feeling that being vocal in "opposition" is an occasion for arrest and exile. The "opposition" assert that Sergius compromised with godlessness when he accepted the Soviet legal prohibition of organized religious instruction of youth under eighteen and other restrictions, and that he has not adequately or fairly exercised his moral duty as head of the Church to defend the faithful and intercede for all in prison; that in these and other matters he has not revealed the quality of moral truth essential to his high office, and has therefore

forfeited his claim to administrative authority. Back of these assertions lie fundamental philosophical and religious conceptions, such as that which maintains that the Soviet Government, being avowedly and constitutionally anti-religious, contaminates the Church at every point of contact ; the State is in fact the Anti-Christ, a conception deeply rooted in Russian religious ideas and becoming especially prominent in times of crisis. The "opposition" hold that it is not enough for the Church to be separated from the State ; the Church should maintain absolute aloofness, if necessary even to the extent of retreating into the catacombs and of having no legalized hierarchial administration. Some members of the "opposition" undoubtedly hold a still more conservative view, adhering to the idea of theocracy. This implies that separation, Church and State mutually recognizing each other, is itself a heresy, that Church and State constitute a single organism, and neither Church administration nor State can be accepted by the faithful until they are again in union.

The Metropolitan Sergius, for his part, has proceeded on the basis that the Church must have the maximum legal existence promised by the constitution. He would probably admit having made mistakes, but would ask that the exigencies of the situation be considered. There is difference of opinion as to the existence of moral turpitude attending certain actions or statements when the avowed purpose is to save the Church even at the expense of personal reputation. And when critics start out with preconceptions contrary to the Metropolitan's basis of agreement with the State, their arguments lose force. The lack of free intercourse with Russia prevents arriving at informed judgment, yet sufficient first hand evidence comes by those arriving from Russia to assert that the "opposition" have grounds for their opposition to his incumbence and policy. However it would seem best for persons abroad to reserve judgment until conditions permit discovering whether Sergius wilfully used other than spiritual measures to maintain his authority, and whether he was conscious of what would seem to be error in some of the statements issued by him. In the meantime one must grant liberty of judgment to those in Russia who are informed and make decision according to their Christian conscience.

In the matter of Sergius' relations with the emigrant Church, the situation is more clear. To be sure, if one accepts the "opposition's" view that Sergius has lost his moral right to function in the Patriarchal office, then the whole case is simplified, and the duty of the Church abroad to withdraw and set up other temporary canonical ties is manifest. But, as has been said, Sergius' case cannot be so lightly dismissed, and one must grant that, since he is legally

recognized and actually administers the vast body of the Church in Russia, he has a right to claim loyal obedience on the part of the bishops and other faithful abroad, and to exercise discipline if necessary. The point at issue is therefore not his right to exercise discipline, but whether he used wisdom and Christian charity in making the decision to interdict the Metropolitan Eulogius and his clergy. Incidentally one must add that the nature of the case is such that Sergius and his Synod could hardly have been influenced by the Soviet authorities to cut off the emigrants, for the logic of the Soviet's atheistic policy would be to maintain the connection in order to have the faults of emigrants as grounds for oppressing the Church in Russia.

Before giving factual details, it will be well to note other historical and psychological elements in the situation. One must not neglect the appearance in the emigration, as well as in Russia, of a new attitude toward episcopal authority. The Revolution marks the close of the period in Russian history which was characterized by a mixing of civil and ecclesiastical functions and authority. The bishop held nominal authority, supplemented by the real authority of the State. During this period of state domination, spiritual authority was on the whole not characteristic of the bishops; rather, the faithful found this quality to lie in the "startzi" (usually ascetic monks), who seldom occupied hierarchical positions. When in 1917 the Church was separated from the State, and political considerations ceased to determine episcopal appointments, the people began again to expect, and actually to find that quality of spirit in their bishops which commanded respect and obedience.

But the Revolution brought about release not only for spiritual authority in the bishops; it released the laity as well for greater participation in Church life. Bereft of state support, the Church began to require more administrative and business experience for the maintenance of its local and national institutions, and naturally turned to the faithful laymen for aid. The people also, having assumed responsibility for the State, naturally began to claim a larger part in the affairs of the Church. These movements were reflected in the presence of representatives of the laity at the great Church Council of 1917, where they exercised no small influence. Since that time the influence of laymen has even increased. In the U.S.S.R. one hears charges of the parish councils lording it over their priests; in the emigration also the laity plays a more active rôle. Significant in this connection was an editorial in Miliukoff's Paris daily, *Latest News*, rejecting the Moscow Patriarchate's right to dismiss the Metropolitan Eulogius and appoint a successor without consulting the flock; we have a voice in saying who shall be our bishop.

The bishops in Russia are quite conservative in regard to the authority which they claim for themselves. In the Metropolitan Sergius' letter of October 28, 1930, to the Metropolitan Eulogius, there appear the following sentences. "Your reference to the desires of your flock and of the clergy collaborating with you in no wise strengthens your position... According to the rules of the Church, the responsibility still lies on the bishop, who, before his consecration, gives a solemn promise to do nothing counter to the canons 'even should the multitude force him to do so' ". In the same document, Sergius demands obedience on the ground of St. Cyprian's well known rule, *episcopum in ecclesia esse et ecclesiam in episcopo*. Sergius is as conscious of his right to demand obedience as Eulogius is conscious of the voice of the people demanding that their counsel be heard.

Thus we see two important, in part contradictory, changes in the attitude toward the administrative structure of the Church — the increase of lay participation in Church affairs, both in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, and the increased spiritual authority of the bishops. One must mention also the altered stratification of social classes dominant in the Church in the U.S.S.R. Parish councils consist quite largely of proletarians and peasants. This does not mean that it is Sergius who has "proletarianized" the Church in Russia — the Revolution has done that, and Sergius simply finds that the elected parish councils consist mainly of workers and peasants instead of intellectuals, officials and large landholders. Although Sergius is himself a man of high education, he has been accepted by the councils as a suitable leader of the "socialized" Church, and in fact it was the support of the proletarian Church members that influenced the Government and made it possible for him in 1927 to raise the Church from anarchy and outlawry to a legalized status and ordered administration.

One might even conclude that the crucial point with the Metropolitan Eulogius and his counsellors arose from this very success of Sergius in maintaining the Church administration in the U.S.S.R. They have felt that the condition for such success must have been subservience rather than a mere Concordat with the godless Soviet Government, and they feared the moment when, as a result of their hierarchical subordination to the Church in Russia, they would be requested by the Patriarchate, and bound by the canons, to execute actions and avow ideas dictated by the Soviet Government through the Patriarchate. Such a request has indeed been foreshadowed in 1927 when Sergius, on the basis of his Concordat, required of Eulogius and of all the emigrant clergy who desired to be considered a part

of the Russian Church a " declaration of loyalty " to the Government under which the Church exists. Sergius explained that by " loyalty " was meant nothing more than non-par'ticipation by the signatories in acts or expressions hostile to the Soviet Government as such, and on this basis the signatures were given by Eulogius and all his clergy.

The right wing of the emigrant Church, under the Metropolitan Anthony, completely rejected the proposal, and they were therefore not reinstated in the rolls of the clergy of the Russian Church. Their hierarchical relationship is no longer to the Russian but to the Serbian Church, and no action of the Moscow Patriarchate has direct effect upon them. In this, their position is similar to the political position of the emigration, in that the latter, by rejecting amnesties offered and finally expiring in January, 1925, simply ceased to be Russian citizens, and have had to be adopted by the League of Nations. They are in no way subject to the Soviet laws ; but, by the same token, are considered by the Soviets as aliens, some of them as outlaws. The Karlovtsi similarly never regained regular status in the Russian Church and are technically alien. They claim " spiritual unity ", however, and in the litany mention the Metropolitan Peter, titular *Locum Tenens* of the Russian Patriarchal throne. Their position therefore does not imply interdiction or excommunication. They were outside the Russian Church when the Metropolitan Sergius, following a break of nearly two years in the functioning of the Patriarchate, secured relegalization of the Patriarchal Office, and they simply stayed outside.

The Karlovtsi believe their status to be determined by Ukaz No. 362 of the Patriarch Tykhon, dated 7/20 November, 1920, reading, in its relevant part, as follows : " In case, as a result of changes in the military front, modification of the frontier of the State, etc., relations between the dioceses and the supreme administration of the Church are found to be disrupted, or if the administration itself, including the Patriarch, is unable to exercise its jurisdiction, the bishop shall without delay connect with the bishops of neighbouring dioceses to organize supreme authority over these dioceses, either as temporary supreme administration of the Church, or as a metropolitan province, or under some other form ".

This document was apparently not known by the Karlovtsi churchmen when, in 1921, they set up the Synod of emigrant bishops and by fiat took charge of the Church abroad, but it subsequently reached them and has ever since served as their commission and charter. Their authority has been challenged on two principal counts. First, that the Ukaz refers only to bishops residing in and actually administering dioceses on erstwhile Russian soil, and not to those

residing beyond former Russian frontiers and claiming administration over a flock which is itself alienated from Russia. The second is a subsequent Patriarchal Ukaz, No. 348, dated April 22-May 5, 1922, in which (1) the circular epistle of the Karlovtsi Council demanding the restoration of the monarchy and Romanoff regime in Russia is disavowed by the Russian Church, (2) the Karlovtsi Council is suppressed, and ecclesiastical authority for the parishes in Western Europe is confided to the Metropolitan Eulogius, and (3) the emigrant bishops who mixed in politics are summoned to trial.

This is an important document, so important in fact that Karlovtsi have rejected its authenticity, or at least have felt that it was written under pressure of the Soviet authorities; and at first even Eulogius declared, "It must have been composed by a third person and subsequently presented for the signature of the Patriarch". Although a mutual agreement was arrived at between Eulogius and Karlovtsi, dividing emigrant Church administration geographically, this agreement manifestly could not stand, and in 1926-27 an open break was effected. From that time on, Karlovtsi asserted even more definitely its complete authority over all Russian Orthodox faithful outside Russia (according to their interpretation of Ukaz No. 362), placed an interdiction on Metropolitan Eulogius, and set up parishes and bishops in the territory the latter had been holding on agreement with them. On the other hand, Eulogius has claimed and actually held authority over the great mass of the emigration in Western Europe, about sixty parishes in all, including practically all the faithful in Paris, the principal centre of the emigration in Europe. The Russian Orthodox Church in America, under the Metropolitan Platon, has kept fairly aloof from the later difficulties of the Church in Europe; the bishops for the nearly quarter-million Russian emigrants in Manchuria and China have on the whole sided with Karlovtsi.

It will be noted that the crux of the Karlovtsi case lies in its assumption that the Moscow Patriarchate is "unable to exercise its jurisdiction" (Ukaz No. 362), being under the tutelage of the Marxist anti-religious government. Naturally the monarchistic, restorationist and theocratic attitude of the right wing of the emigration, with which Karlovtsi is identified, plays a considerable part in forming this position. Eulogius, up to 1930, maintained that the Patriarchate was able to function, and therefore had the right to claim obedience. His counsellors have, on the whole, been of more liberal political and social orientation.

In the summer of 1930 a change took place which led Eulogius to share the feeling that the Patriarchal Office was not uninfluenced

by Soviet political aspirations. In the beginning of this changed attitude, Eulogius felt that Sergius was innocent of extra-ecclesiastical motives, but helpless before the Soviet dictatorship of mind and body in Russia. By the spring of 1931, however, possibly under the influence of the "opposition" attitude in Russia, Eulogius began to wonder if Sergius' loyalty to the Church had not become contaminated by Soviet contacts. The statement of Sergius, in February 1930, widely published in the U.S.S.R. and abroad, denying religious persecution in Russia, could not but lead to doubt of his independence, even though persons acquainted with actual conditions in Russia have undertaken to explain Sergius' action. In the spring of 1930, just after Sergius' statement, Eulogius shared in public gatherings organized to protest against religious persecution in Russia. In consequence, on June 10, 1930 (Ukaz No. 108), Sergius removed Eulogius from his post as chief administrator of the parishes in Western Europe, proposing the Archbishop Vladimir of Nice as his successor. The latter declined the office, the Diocesan Council called by Eulogius rejected the Ukaz, and Eulogius was obliged to write Sergius attempting to justify his position, yet indicating the probable necessity of the emigrant parishes withdrawing from the Moscow administration while, like Karlovtsi, retaining spiritual unity with the Russian Church.

On October 28, 1930 Sergius categorically demanded retraction and submission, meanwhile placing an injunction on ordination by the Metropolitan Eulogius. Three of the bishops under Eulogius favoured intransigence; one, Bishop Benjamin, favoured submission. Early in 1931 the Metropolitan Eleutherius of Kovno appeared in Paris as representative of Sergius to receive Eulogius' retraction, or himself to assume the administration if Eulogius refused. The day after their conversation, Eulogius departed for Constantinople, and soon returned with a document confirming his spiritual and administrative authority over the Russian Orthodox parishes in Western Europe, covered by an assignment as Exarch of the Oecumenical Patriarch. Thereby the flock passed from Russian to Greek authority in the same way as those under Karlovtsi had earlier become subject to the Serbs, and the canonical status of the sacraments was assured regardless of disciplinary measures which Sergius might take.

Eleutherius returned to Kovno, but those who joined him in continued loyalty to the Russian Patriarchate set up a parish church in Paris and another in Berlin. In due time there reached Paris a new Ukaz, No. 4954, dated May 20, 1931, from the Patriarchate, placing an interdiction on Eulogius and all his clergy provided they finally fail to retract. When presented with this document by the

Metropolitan Eleutherius, specially visiting Paris for the purpose, Eulogius merely acknowledged it, saying he would pass it on to his "superior", the Oecumenical Patriarch, as his new position completely removes him from the administrative jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Such is the situation in June, 1931. The Metropolitan Sergius seems deserted by all but a handful (literally a few hundred) of the emigration. Its parish is installed in a basement garage in a middle-class section of Paris where, following the new custom in the U.S.S.R., daily mass is held not only late in the forenoon, but early in the morning, to permit attendance before going to work. Those loyal to the Patriarchate are prohibited by the bishop from communicating in the "schismatic" churches and vice versa. This appears to many needless insistence on the letter of the law and in fact a breach of Christian love. It can be understood only in light of the rigours of an intolerant regime in Russia, which affects even Church life, and in light of the early Christian conception of the Church as a chosen society, to be kept unspotted from the world. It represents a sort of fanaticism; the western world is repelled by it, feeling that the Church should prepare the world for redemption by living and working in it, not by withdrawing from it. But no one can say that the latter plan has sufficiently advanced the cause of the Kingdom, and at least the rigorous attitude must be recognized as true to the teaching of many of the leaders of the Early Church.

The Metropolitan Eleutherius has impressed people with his spiritual purpose, his firmness, his desire to hold or win the faithful not by polemic and social pressure but by the righteousness, as he sees it, of the cause of the Moscow Patriarchate, and by the reality of the Christian life of those who follow. To be loyal to the Church in Russia means voluntarily to share in her sufferings. His residence in Kovno and his ascetic nature are probably responsible for his tendency to simplify the situation, both in Russia and in the emigration, rather than to inform himself adequately on its ramifications. This simplification has led to the criticism that he has not done all he might have done to avoid an open break, for if he had fully understood the fundamental loyalty of the emigrant faithful to the Mother Church as a whole, and also the uncertainties connected with Metropolitan Sergius' position, he might have been able to influence the latter not to take the final step, interdiction, but to reach some agreement more consonant with pastoral patience and Christian love.

The position of the Metropolitan Eulogius is rather difficult. Eminent canonists declare the Oecumenical Patriarch had no canonical right to "interfere" in the affairs of another autocephalous

Church, for the Oecumenical Patriarch is not the "Pope of the East", but only, in western terminology, the President of the Council of the heads of the several autocephalous Orthodox Eastern Churches. The Pro-Synod of these Churches, at its meeting proposed for October, 1931, will consider this matter. It would ordinarily seem that the only ground for the Patriarch's action could be the revolutionary, and consequently uncertain situation in Russia, which comes near to the Karlovtsi interpretation of Ukaz No. 362. If the Patriarch is upheld, then what ground can there be for difference between Eulogius and Karlovtsi? The Patriarch and Eulogius can state that the Patriarch Tykhon, though living under Soviet dictatorship, was independent and uninfluenced when issuing Ukaz No. 362, condemning Karlovtsi and appointing Eulogius, whereas Tykhon's successor Sergius, in removing Eulogius, was dependent and influenced. There is ground for this position, as the Soviet Government is in 1931 unquestionably firmer in control of all aspects of life in Russia than it was in 1922. Aside from the technical and canonical differences which have been described, the practical differences between Karlovtsi and the Eulogian faithful will continue to be those growing out of the social and political orientation of the individual.

True religious quality and life is to be found in both groups, but again, according to type. The monks of Karlovtsi either go to Mt. Athos or become ascetics. One of their number is held in the highest esteem by the faithful in all groups by reason of the great development of his mystical, spiritual life. The monks of Eulogius (there have been many tonsured, especially young intellectuals, since 1925) become parish priests, even working in factories for a livelihood and serving practically without payment. The Karlovtsi claim most of the titled aristocracy among their adherents. Eulogius unquestionably has had the intellectual aristocracy, though a few have not followed him to Constantinople. Karlovtsi has failed to produce any new living forms of Church life. They have been active in missionary undertakings in the Podkarpatsky Russ, endeavouring to regain the population from the Uniat to the Orthodox position. Eulogius in 1924 established the Orthodox Theological Institute in Paris, giving instruction to thirty to forty students each year. He, as well as Bishop Benjamin, has also given invaluable counsel, inspiration and support to the Russian Student Christian Movement, with its enthusiastic reawakening of interest, participation and responsibility of lay youth in the life of the Church.

As regards the great movements of rapprochement between the Churches, especially toward the intercommunion of Orthodox and Anglicans, Karlovtsi, with the exception of the Metropolitan Anthony

himself, is conservative, formal, relatively inactive. The theologians and others in the Church organizations of the Eulogius group, on the contrary, are devoting themselves intelligently and with consecration to this problem, while by no means surrendering their "orthodoxy". Those siding with Eleutherius and the Patriarchate in Moscow believe the breach should first be made up in the Russian Church itself, then talk of reunion with the West. Naturally their very affiliation with Moscow makes them feel that the authorities in Moscow, not those abroad, should take the lead in such matters, and, as Moscow is quite cut off from the rest of the world, their position is stagnated. The Metropolitan Sergius was at one time an active member in the St. Petersburg branch of the Anglican and Eastern Church Association, and his interest in the problem is revealed in an article published in his *Patriarchal Journal* in February, 1931.

Since the days of the Patriarch Nikon and the Old Believers, there has been no such period of deep examination of the principles of liberty and authority in the Church in Russia. Each Russian must ask himself where he stands. And when bishops polemize and excommunicate each other, whither can the layman go for authority? By western logic, the result would be discredit of the bishops and falling away to Rome, to Protestantism, or to unbelief. There is some of this, but very little, for the Russian mind is not driven by strict intellectual processes. Spiritual elements soften the harshness of logic, as one must admit, do also elements of intellectual laziness or haziness. Most people continue to worship where they have been worshipping. Some, who are not psychologically dependent on spiritual food, leave in disillusionment; those whose natures require spiritual satisfaction but are at the same time intelligently alive to the historical moment, have not lost faith in the Church. As an example of this attitude of tolerance and Christian charity one may cite the Russian Student Christian Movement. It embraces active leaders under both Eulogius and Eleutherius, and its spirit was well shown at the service of thanksgiving following its annual Council meeting, June 2, 1931, when the deacon pronounced in the litany not only the name of Metropolitan Peter, recognized by all three groups, but the names of Metropolitan Sergius, Metropolitan Eleutherius and the Metropolitan Eulogius, all in the same breath, and the members of the Council in faith and in hope prayed and sang "Many Years" for the Russian Church as a whole.

Attempts to solve the problem by reference to the canons have failed, partly because ancient rules are not sufficiently explicit for modern situations, and partly because of the fact that the problem itself is not purely ecclesiastical, but moral and political as well.

A westerner's tendency to throw off the canons as needless tradition would find no reception among the Orthodox faithful. If episcopal authority is questioned, it is not by protest against the canons, but by insistence on the moral uprightness of the holder of episcopal dignity.

If the Russian Church can find no solution of itself, as now seems the case, then the next suitable step toward solution would seem to be to follow canonical procedure, and secure judgment by the most competent body, viz., the Pro-Synod of the several autocephalous Orthodox Eastern Churches, sitting *in corpore*. Fortunately the last decade has seen the revival of interest and the taking of practical steps toward calling together such a body, an event not witnessed in many centuries. Such an assembly should be able to deal adequately with the moral and ecclesiastical aspects of the problem; it would remain to be seen whether this would suffice in the political situation created by the Soviet Revolution.

Paul B. ANDERSON.

An International Pilgrimage to Ireland, April 1931

A beautiful thing appears more lovely as we point it out to a friend, because, in the joy of sharing, we see through our friend's eyes as well as through our own. And to try and explain to someone else is a valuable way of sifting our own knowledge, as all of us know who have tried to answer rapidly and clearly those fearsome questions: What is the Student Christian Movement? What is the World's Student Christian Federation? For, whether we leave the enquirer more or less muddled than before he asked, by the attempt to explain and interpret, we have steadied and set in focus our own view of our country's movement and of the Federation. A corresponding experience came to some Irish students as the International Pilgrimage to Ireland ended at Trinity Hall, Dublin, last week.

Amy Buller was the originator of the idea and its guardian angel as well! Thanks to her, on April 6th students of sixteen different nationalities left London in search of Ireland. In Belfast and Dublin they were awaited by eager hostesses, who, through the arrangement of the Irish council of the movement, received the delegates and entertained them for a few days. Thus the first experience of the travellers was of individual hospitality and the

welcome of an Irish home. "The ancient Irish", Tom Finnegan told us a few days later, "were never so happy as when entertaining travellers, and dispelling their hunger and gloom", and, if history repeated itself, the happiness of the modern Irish was due, less to consciousness of their own virtue than to delight with the charm of their guests! Whatever the cause, it was clear that when, on Friday April 10th, the travellers assembled at Trinity Hall, together with an equal number of Irish students (making 51 in all) for the second stage of the Pilgrimage, there was no ice of shyness or reserve to be broken, for we met as friends. The Irish students were anxious that in the hearts of their guests was a real desire to understand Ireland and to come into fellowship and sympathy with her. Both groups were anxious to see the world in its true perspective, and to reconcile in the discovery of God's purpose for mankind, the passion of national aspiration with the vision of universal brotherhood. Therefore, the aim towards which our thought directed itself was two-fold.

In the interpretation of the mind of Ireland and the revelation of her spirit, the Pilgrimage had the help of many, who in different spheres are her servants, lovers and friends. Professor Tom Finnegan of Magee College, Londonderry, a past secretary of the movement, formally introduced the conference to "Ireland today". Professor Henry of Queen's University, Belfast, Dr. Larchet, professor of music at the National University, Mr. Lennox Robinson, one of the directors of the Abbey Theatre spoke to us of Ireland's heritage and Ireland's contribution to the life of the world in philosophy, music, art and literature. Great as were their gifts to us in increase of knowledge and of delight, probably we owed an even deeper debt for real illumination and a vision of the Ireland that may be to our hostess, Miss Cunningham, the warden of Trinity Hall. In conversations, in group discussion, she was ever the bringer of fire and inspiration, while few who heard them will forget the spirit of her farewell words to the Pilgrimage.

In the afternoons, we made expeditions to the Zoological Gardens, the Wicklow Mountains, a special recital of Irish fantasias by the Free State No1, Army Band under Col. Fritz Brase, and were visited by members of the Abbey Theatre Company who presented Lady Gregory's comedy "*The Workhouse Ward*".

The series of lectures which linked up our thought of Ireland with our thought of the world by setting before us an interpretation of nationalism that was satisfying, square with the facts, yet neither rigid nor materialistic, was begun by Professor Roxby of Liverpool University, whose subjects were "Nationalism, its contribution

culturally " and " Nationalism, its dangers politically ", and concluded by Mr. Bolton Waller, who spoke on the subject of " Nationalism and Internationalism ". Stimulating, challenging and encouraging to idealism and the hope of world brotherhood as these lectures were, it was during the discussions which followed that some of the most fruitful and vital forces of the conference came into play. Some of us had assented glibly enough to the fine sentiment, that increase of strength and power ought to mean increased responsibility and increased opportunities to serve the weaker and the less powerful. But such assent became less easy, and less free from shame, as nation after nation, needing help and service, pleaded against misunderstanding, injustice and even oppression — when we heard Mrs. Kim from Korea, Verona Mermelstein from Hungary, Sebastian from India, Koi from the Gold Coast, Thea von Seydenitz and Kaufmann and Siweking from Germany. All were not without bitterness, some had found it almost intolerably hard to keep alive the charity that suffereth long and is kind. But over and over again, we could watch throughout the Pilgrimage a spirit of courage, of kindness, of frankness and of fellowship kindling amongst us. And as the days went on from a common sense of guilt, arose a common desire for forgiveness, and a resolve to build our national and international life better in the future.

None of us was in doubt as to why this came to pass. We were all conscious that the Pilgrimage had been conceived and carried through in the spirit of prayer. On the opening morning our chairman, Bill Cargin, set before us two hopes for the conference : that we might find a richer fellowship, and a fresh vision of the purpose of God. Each day he guided our meditations towards the will of God for ourselves and for our nation. On Sunday morning, in the Chapel of Trinity College, Charles Warner and Warren Scott led us in a service of intercession and worship, that lifted our hearts into a realization of the unity of our several nations in Christ. On the closing night, representatives of each continent expressed what the Pilgrimage had meant to them, and voiced their resolve to keep faith with the ideals that had become so real during these days. Finally, Tom Finnegan, at family prayers led us in meditation, worship and thanksgiving. We confessed our need of personal and national forgiveness, and rededicated ourselves to the service of the Master.

V. S. F.

BOOK REVIEWS

Three Spiritual Pilgrimages

TROIS HISTOIRES SPIRITUELLES: SAINT AUGUSTIN, LUTHER, PASCAL, by Pierre Maury. *Cahiers de Foi et Vie*, Paris, 1931. Price: 12 French francs.

Foi et Vie, which can look back on an extraordinarily interesting and fruitful service to the cause of Protestantism in the French speaking world, has recently shown that it intends to remain a pioneer in Christian thought. The magazine has gone through a process of rejuvenation in form and content, which promises much for the future. *The Student World* has good reason to rejoice in the success of its colleague, because of the close relationship in emphasis and outlook which exists between the two magazines.

A specially valuable service of *Foi et Vie* is the publication of its *Cahiers*. The first of these was devoted to a timely and exceedingly well prepared survey of the "new humanism". A further publication is a series of lectures, which the editor of *Foi et Vie*, Pierre Maury, well known to readers of *The Student World*, gave at Geneva in the winter of 1929-30. The volume gives no more and no less than the title promises. These are not exhaustive biographical or scientific studies, dealing with the difficult historical and theological problems which are involved in the study of these three great Christians. They are rather studies in God's ways of dealing with men, exemplified in the lives of three men who belong among the first of the "cloud of witnesses".

This is a delicate and difficult task, which cannot be accomplished without ability to lay hold of the essence of the spiritual struggles and victories of men, about whom so much has been written and said that their main message has almost become obscured. Monsieur Maury has precisely that gift. His amazing facility in coining precise and clear formulas makes him an ideal interpreter of "spiritual pilgrimages". The result is that we come to know Augustine, Luther and Pascal in a new and more vital way.

Monsieur Maury sees these three as men different from each other in background, temperament and even in purpose, but united in faith, that is united in the experience of God's transforming action in their lives. All three discover in their own way that God is a living God and all three regard this discovery as the one and only

matter of importance which they have to pass on to the world. Thus their lives bear witness to the truth of the wonderful saying of Pascal : " Only Grace can make a saint out of a man ; those who doubt this truth know neither what it is to be a saint nor what it is to be a man ".

There are certain points in the presentation which might be challenged. Is not Luther, for instance, pictured too much as if he were a Lutheran theologian of the seventeenth century ? Is there as much danger of quietism in his teaching as Monsieur Maury thinks ? But the book is so full of deep insight that we would rather thankfully accept it as it is.

V. t H.

Christian Realism

DU ERDE HÖRE! REDEN UND BETRACHTUNGEN, von Prof. D. Dr. Alfred Dedo Müller. *Furche Verlag, Berlin, 1931: Preis : RM 6,50; Geb. RM 7.80.*

This volume of essays, addresses and sermons belongs to the best of recent literature on the subject of the Christian message in relation to the problems of our time and generation. It is Professor Müller's conviction that *presentation* of the Christian message means to make the Christian message become a *present* reality. " The Church is the real confirmation of the life of Christ on earth. It is, therefore, the task of preaching to let the living word, which God speaks to humanity in Jesus Christ, become dynamic in every time ". Thus the Christian message should never be stabilized (the danger of orthodoxy) or isolated from the world (the danger of pietism). But neither should it sacrifice its character as a word of God and uncritically accept the spirit of the times (danger of liberalism).

This can only be done on the basis of a Christian realism, which differs from secular and autonomous realism in that it sees the world in relation to its Creator. Only if Christianity shows that it has a deeper and more adequate understanding of the world as it is than any modern philosophy, can it regain the confidence of modern men. Practically this means that the preacher must be able to deal with the Christian message in terms of such modern realities as industrialism, athletics, uncertainty about moral standards, international politics, etc. The Church must regain its full autonomy, cease to be dependent on extraneous authorities such as the state, the present social order, the accepted standards, and find a " style of its own ".

These principles find their illustration in the various parts of the book. Since so much of it consists of lectures and sermons, these illustrations are remarkably simple and concrete. Thus the book can serve as a very useful introduction to the discussions about the Church in the modern world for all those to whom similar german works of Gogarten, Tillich, Spoerri or Brunner are too "philosophical".

The range of subjects dealt with is wide. Practically all important problems of our time are discussed in their bearing on the Christian message and vice versa. The danger of the approach is that the concern with problems crowds out the human concern with men. There is in some of the sermons a lack of personal appeal. Does not the ideal of a "concrete message" imply nearness to concrete persons as well as to concrete issues of our time? And there is sometimes a tendency to present Christian truth in a form which may make it easier for modern man to accept it, but which tends to leave out essentials of the message. (Compare what is said about the Church on p. 258 with p. 26). But the book as a whole is a fine example of the encouraging attempts which many make today to discover an effective Christian message, addressed to the needs of our time.

V. t H.

DESTIN DU SIÈCLE, par Jean-Richard Bloch, *Les Editions Rieder*
"Collection Europe", Paris. Price 15.— French frs.

We have heard much of after war unrest. Literature in all countries bears witness to this "nouveau mal du siècle" of which the symptoms are to be found either in the reappearance of authoritarian systems or in the most radical moral nihilism. It is a period of making admissions and of uncertainties. It begins to look as if we were getting out of this confusion, and as if some great spirits were giving a lead in outlining our future destiny.

M. Jean-Richard Bloch, a talented novelist, but even more a wise essayist, makes an attempt to give us new orientations. He enumerates successively the obsolete legacies of the past, the faiths which according to him belong to the past. He studies the material bases of our present civilization, then he analyses the position of the modern man at the cross-roads, appealed to on the one hand by mechanistic materialism and on the other by invincible spiritual values. Specially remarkable are reflections on communism as a possible renewal of civilization. M. J.-R. Bloch, who is considered in France to be a writer of the left, even of the extreme left — he is

one of the principal contributors to the review *Europe* — seems to believe that Marxism alone is incapable of creating a new order. He is searching for some other assurance that the modern man will not succumb to the dangers which beset him from delirious industrialism, national passions and moral anarchy. This assurance will not be that of Christianity. As a matter of fact, one of the most striking things about these essays is that Christianity is not seriously taken into account. For the writer it no longer presents a problem, nor is it even a subject of controversy. It is finished. We must look for something else by which to live. But what? A frank acceptance of the world which modern science has created for us, a relative world, a renouncement of all transcendence and of all absolute. "It is to be presumed that one day, man realizing that he is integrated in an entirely relative world, will in his mind completely integrate the conception of the relative. Then he will not be at all surprised if he is asked to suffer and to die for gods which are not immortal. But this time will not come until the different attributes of life, beginning with life itself, have abandoned one by one this character of absolute, this self-existence which man has conferred on them for millions of years".

Is the modern man prepared to attach so little importance to himself? The pride of our age hardly leads us to expect this. Is Christianity really so obsolete, and are its adherents so much behind their age? We can assure M. J.-R. Bloch that his analysis on this point is at least incomplete. Christendom certainly is passing through a very grave crisis, but whatever be the issue of this crisis, it will take nothing away of the truth of Christianity. And it is the truth of Christianity which is the only problem. Once more we must take care not to confuse Christianity with Christendom.

So this remarkable book does not cause us to doubt our faith, but it makes us wish that it were more real and active in the world today.

P. M.

The next number of *The Student World* on "Christianity and Communism", which will appear in October will prove of great value to all those who seek trustworthy information about the appeal of Communism to youth and who are preoccupied with the question of the Christian answer to the Communistic challenge. There will be articles on the spiritual situation in Russia, and on Communism in the Far East by eye-witnesses. The list of contributors will include: N. Berdiaeff, M. Kakehi, Y. T. Wu, Karl Heim, Paul B. Anderson, Fritz Lieb, Julius Schmidthausen.

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